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Highlights 
 The empirical evidence on the long-run impact of reforms on industry is limited. 
 We evaluate the long-run performance of the privatized firms and their competitors. 
 Our sample cement industry is from an emerging market facing much turmoil. 
 The long-term financial profitability/efficiency of privatized firms has declined. 
 Technical progress, not efficiency, has brought long-run productivity growth. 
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Long-Run Performance of an Industry after Broader Reforms including 
Privatization 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Research on the impacts of broader reforms, including privatization on firms’ long-run financial 
and operational performance, is extremely important but only occasionally performed. This study 
evaluates the long-run financial performance, total factor productivity, efficiency and technology 
of Pakistani cement manufacturing firms. We conclude that privatized firms have in fact achieved 
significant productivity growth in the long run due to technological progress compared to no 
growth in the pre-reform period. Interestingly, however, better productive performance has not 
contributed to long-run profitability and income efficiency gains, thereby casting serious doubt on 
the long-run financial benefits of reforms, including privatization. 
 
JEL classification: D24, D41, D42, L25, L33, L61 
Keywords: privatization; reforms; productivity; technical change; financial performance; cement 
industry; Pakistan  
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1. Introduction 
Following the lead from the developed countries, a significant number of governments in 
developing countries have implemented privatization programmes since the early 1980s to let the 
market economy function and to use the subsidies allocated to public enterprises for the social 
sector in general and poverty reduction in particular. Boubakri et al. (2008), in regard to the 
objectives of privatization, stated that the “primary aim is to reduce the role of the government as 
a dominant actor (stakeholder) in the economy and to favour the emergence of an active private 
sector”. In terms of evaluation of the success of these policies, despite the significant efforts in 
comparing the performance of firms in pre- and post-privatization periods, conclusions drawn from 
these studies are still not clear. These mixed messages regarding the success/failure of the 
privatization programmes are adding fuel to uncertainty. One of the consequences of all this is that 
governments in some developing countries, despite their best efforts, have been unable to sell 
larger public sector corporations and utility companies.  
 
There could be a number of reasons contributing to the contrasting conclusions drawn: first, some 
authors, such as Galal et al. (1994), argued that the success of the privatization policy varies by 
countries depending on the level of economic development. Surprisingly, despite the growing 
literature on the impact of privatization in developed countries, only a remarkably few studies, 
including Saygili and Taymaz (2001), Chirwa (2004), Bartel and Harrison (2005) and Okten and 
Arin (2006), have looked into the long-term ex post productive and financial performance of the 
privatized enterprises in developing countries. This was corroborated by Boubakri et al. (2008) 
who, when reviewing the performance of privatized firms in developing countries, stated that “in 
spite of the growing importance of the privatization phenomenon in developing countries, it is 
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surprising that only a few studies have examined the impact of privatization on firm performance 
in these countries”. Furthermore, some developing countries such as Pakistan have witnessed 
unparalleled political and religious turmoil since the launch of the privatization programme back 
in the early 1990s. Hence, conclusions drawn from empirical studies of developed countries in 
general, and Pakistan in particular, could be different and difficult to generalize for developed or 
other developing countries.  
 
Second, most of the early influential studies on the impact of privatization and broader reforms, 
such as Megginson et al. (1994), Galal et al. (1994) and Barberis et al. (1996), used only a few 
years of post-privatization data to understand the immediate short-term impact of privatization. 
Barberis et al. (1996) in this regard clearly stated: “Nonetheless, our approach is useful if one 
wants to understand how particular privatization strategies can have immediate effects.” The 
improved short run financial and operational performance of privatized firms could have been due 
to changes in industry and economic conditions alongside other exogenous factors rather than 
ownership change per se. Similarly, it has been argued that the short-term impact of privatization 
could be negligible in some industries if restructuring is not introduced at the time of privatization 
or the entry of new firms is not ensured immediately after privatization, particularly in an 
oligopolistic competition environment.  
 
The third reason, and a very important one, is the nature of the industry being analysed. The 
privatization and deregulation policy aims to address the issues of market power and the promotion 
of higher competition resulting in better productive performance, but for some industries, broader 
reforms, including privatization, could lead to even lower competition levels due to illegal 
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collusion practices resulting in no change in efficiency/productivity, or even worse a decrease. The 
interlinkage between competition and firm performance was reiterated by Asaftei et al. (2008) 
who concluded that fully private firms performed better than public sector firms when firms were 
operating in a competitive environment. Hence, privatization in conjunction with the creation of a 
competitive environment delivers the required results.  
 
Specifically, in some industries, such as the cement industry, there is a greater potential for forming 
a cartel in the long run. This is due to the higher sunk cost of setting up a cement manufacturing 
plant, developing limestone and other raw material quarries to source inputs and the maintenance 
of raw material inventories etc. This discourages the entry of new firms as well as forcing existing 
smaller-sized firms, in particular, to exit and thus pave the way for explicit/tacit collusion. The 
collusion could be further helped by the post-privatization decrease in the number of producers 
due to the merger of smaller firms with larger ones in seeking to utilize scale economies. Not 
surprisingly, there has also been continued international interest in the assessment of competitive 
conditions in the cement industry right across the world for many years1. Not surprisingly, since 
the mass privatization of the cement industry in Pakistan in 1991/92 as well as post-reform mergers 
and acquisitions, there have also been serious allegations of collusion among Pakistani cement 
manufacturers.  
 
                                                 
1 Some of these studies include Zeidan and Resende (2009) and Salvo (2010) for Brazil, Hüschelrath and Veith (2013) 
for Germany, Rosenbaum and Sukharomana (2001) for the USA, Çelen and Gunalp (2010) for Turkey, Bejger (2012) 
for India, Steen and Sørgard (1999) for Norway, and Bejger (2011) for Poland. 
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One of the primary objectives of this study is to address the above-mentioned issues and establish 
whether or not the privatization and broader reforms have resulted in a better long run financial 
performance and more efficient production operation within the Pakistani cement industry. Except 
for Ghulam and Jaffry (2015), no comprehensive study of the productive performance has been 
carried out since the privatization of the cement industry in Pakistan. The few studies we have 
come across on post-privatization performance evaluation lacked rigour and mostly used financial 
ratios on a selected number of firms. This was probably due to a lack of research culture and data 
availability issues. We extend the Ghulam and Jaffry framework in estimating total factor 
productivity by further estimating the components of efficiency change (such as pure efficiency 
change and scale efficiency change) and technical change (i.e. pure technical change and change 
in the scale of technology) alongside an analysis of the financial performance of the industry by 
utilizing commonly used financial indicators.  
 
Similarly to a significant number of studies that have utilized a single industry, we have a small 
number of observations to estimate cross-period distance functions to be used subsequently to 
calculate productivity growth and its components and hence could have less reliable productivity 
estimates using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) due to the well-known convergence issues. To 
overcome some of the inherent issues with the DEA estimator, we bootstrap the productivity and 
its sources and carry out statistical inferences as well as supplementing the analysis by looking at 
similar-type firms from five industries belonging to the Pakistani manufacturing industry who 
experienced broader reforms including privatization at the same time and ownership transfer 
method for both the long run financial and productive performance analysis.   
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Our study utilizes data on almost all cement manufacturing firms in Pakistan over 26 years, 
covering the period of pre- (six years) and post- (20 years) privatization and broader reforms. The 
duration of our study covers four business cycles, six political governments and one military 
regime, each with its own strategy/policy, but with a common agenda: “let the private sector grow 
and function”. Pakistan, being one of many developing countries with an underdeveloped 
economy, has an extremely low per capita income and the highly unstable political system 
alongside been badly affected by terrorism activities provides an interesting setting. The study 
aims to provide a valuable extension of the existing international literature on the long-term impact 
of privatization generally and on developing countries’ manufacturing sector in particular. As far 
as we are aware, except for the studies of Chirwa (2004) and Ghulam and Jaffry (2015), our long 
sample period exceeds that of other studies of developing countries on this issue.  
 
Our findings regarding pre- and post-reform cement manufacturer firms’ financial performance 
can be summarized as follows. First, on average, except for privately owned firms, industry, as 
well as a group of privatized and public (state-owned) firms, experienced a long-run decline in 
profitability in the overall post-reform (1992 onward) period. Second, any improvement in labour 
use efficiency in the group of privatized firms in the initial years of the post-privatization period, 
perhaps due to rationalization of the workforce, was lost within a few years. Third, real median 
sales increased for the entire industry as well as for the group of private firms over a longer post-
reform period, and the increase was statistically significant too. However, this cannot be said of 
privatized firms. For the overall industry, and the group of private firms, most improvement came 
during the longer-term post-reform period (1999 to 2011).  
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Fourth, for the overall post-reform period, as well as for the immediate first seven years, the group 
of private and privatized firms experienced an increase in capital spending but the improvement 
was statistically significant only for the privatized firms. Fifth, when cement industry performance 
is compared against other similar firms from the manufacturing industry that also experienced 
privatization almost at the same time, the estimates show that except for privatized firms in the 
automobile industry, firms belonging to all other comparable industries did not improve their 
profitability in the short or long run in the post-reform period. The automobile industry, however, 
enjoys a significant monopoly power. Sixth, in another sensitivity analysis exercise, we look at 
two other industries that did not experience privatization, and broadly speaking, our main 
conclusions are that despite some marginal improvements, at least for one industry, the post-reform 
long-run financial performance outcomes of these two industries are not any better than other 
industries irrespective of choice of indicator and post-reform time periods.  
   
When cement industry productive performance during pre- and post-reform periods is evaluated, 
the conclusions can be summarized as follows. First, the industry witnessed a more than three per 
cent growth during the post-reform period, with technological progress being the sole contributor, 
compared to the negative growth before the reforms. In particular, during the longer-term post-
reform period (since 1999), industry has done exceptionally well. Second, privatized firms showed 
no productivity growth under public sector ownership (1987–1991), but more than 2 per cent p.a. 
after change of ownership. The growth in productivity was achieved due to the technological 
development despite a decline in efficiency. For the initial post-privatization period (1992–1999), 
similarly to the industry, the group of privatized firms did not show any improvement/decline in 
productivity. An improvement in the technological growth was offset by a decline in efficiency. 
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Hence, improvement in productivity for privatized firms came in the longer-term post-
reform/privatization period. Interestingly, firms were able to move to best-practice frontier firms 
during the longer run post-reform period. The productivity growth would perhaps have been even 
higher if firms had been able to utilize their production capacity better and had achieved higher 
scale efficiency. They were unable to do this due to significant capacity additions resulting in 
excess capacity of the industry, particularly from 1999 onward.   
 
Third, firms that remained under state ownership after the mass privatization in 1992 did not 
perform any better during the periods 1987–1991 and 1992–99. In particular, during 1992–99, an 
impressive technological progress of more than 5 per cent p.a. was swallowed up by a decline in 
efficiency due to operating at suboptimal level perhaps due to outdated technology and tough 
competition from private and privatized firms. For the private firms, similarly to their peer groups, 
no significant productivity growth was achieved during the pre-reform period, while in the post-
reform/privatization period, this group of firms recorded an impressive performance with more 
than 4 per cent growth p.a. with the contribution of technological progress (negligible efficiency 
increase). These estimates are more than 9 per cent growth p.a. during the period 1999 to 2011 
with technological progress of more than 9 per  cent p.a. (no contribution from efficiency 
improvement again).  
 
Fourth, after carrying out the sensitivity analysis we could conclude that in contrast to the cement 
industry, except for smaller-size and less capital-intensive industries such as cooking oil, 
engineering, chemical and automobile either experienced no improvement in productivity or 
indeed a decline over five and ten years in the post-reform and privatization period. This decline 
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in productivity is also confirmed after dividing the sample firms into different ownerships such as 
public, privatized and private. Interestingly, in the industries where there is evidence of significant 
productivity gains, in complete contrast to the cement industry, improvement in productivity has 
been as a result of the catching up of the efficiency frontier (efficiency improvement) rather than 
the shifting of the frontier (technological progress). Fifth, multivariate regression results confirm 
that rather than just change of ownership, other factors such as pressure and burden of financial 
expenses, demand conditions and population contributed positively to the productivity growth of 
the cement industry.  
 
The structure of the rest of the paper is such that Section two provides justification of the study by 
highlighting that why is a longitudinal study of the long-run impact of privatization needed. 
Section three provides a summary of the empirical literature on the impact of reforms on firms’ 
financial and productive performance. The next two sections present an overview of the Pakistani 
privatization programme and the development in the cement industry. Section six covers the 
conceptual framework and the techniques used for financial performance evaluation and 
productivity estimation. Data and financial performance analysis, alongside productivity and its 
more elaborate components (sources), are presented in Sections seven and eight. The last section 
(nine) is dedicated to a summary of the conclusions drawn. 
2. Why is a longitudinal study of the long-run impact of privatization needed 
generally and Pakistan in particularly? 
As discussed above and in the literature review later on, a significant number of existing empirical 
studies that have evaluated the impact of broader reforms, including privatization, have used a 
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sample with a relatively shorter time span, covering at most five to seven years of the post-reform 
period. As discussed above, we believe that this could have contributed to misleading conclusions 
regarding the long-run dynamic impact of reforms on individual firms, the entire industry, 
consumers and the government. In the following, we briefly discuss why it is important to 
distinguish between the short- and long-run impact of reforms and the consequences of ignoring 
post-reform dynamic changes spreading over a longer time period (many years). 
 
Collusion after privatization 
The easing of new firms’ entry and freedom in setting prices, subsequent to reforms, brings the 
potential of the formation of a cartel by these privatized firms themselves, or they could be part of 
industry-wide collusion. The formation of collusion could have serious implications for the long-
run financial and productive performance of the privatized firms as well as for the entire industry. 
Politically, it would be damaging for the privatization policy itself as well as for consumer welfare. 
By observing firms over a longer period of time, we would be able to better understand the dynamic 
effects of privatization on competitive conditions in an industry where the presence of sunk cost 
makes it a perfect candidate for an overt or explicit collusion. 
  
Business cycles and distortions 
Broadly speaking, in evaluating the short- and medium-term impact of privatization, two sets of 
methodologies have been used: financial ratios and efficiency/productivity estimates. Financial 
ratios over three to five years pre and post privatization have been widely used in empirical 
literature. The second strand of literature in this regard used parametric or non-parametric 
techniques to measure efficiency (profit, cost, production). In general, the impact of privatization 
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has been understood to appear instantly. That is, most of the expected effect on efficiency and 
productivity would have occurred in the early years after privatization (or even with the 
announcement of privatization or before), but due to the cyclical nature of some businesses, 
conclusions drawn from short-term impacts could be misleading. By evaluating privatized firms 
over a short time span, the potential of noise in the data and abnormal profitability or productivity 
estimates cannot be ruled out. Hence, profitability/efficiency/productivity estimates derived from 
a longer sample period are likely to be more robust to economic fluctuations as well as short-term 
distortions introduced by a particular government action. 
 
Dynamic impacts  
It takes a considerable time for firms to make adjustments to the input mix, in order to achieve the 
optimal scale of production and the expansion of production capacity to realize economies of scale. 
Years of under-investments under public ownership would also lead to the need for a significant 
long-term investment in technology upgrades after privatization of these firms. Analysis spread 
over the longer post-privatization period would indicate a more dynamic impact of reforms in 
terms of firms making adjustment in the use and combination of labour, capital, energy mix and 
raw material, in particular, to achieve the best combination alongside operating at optimal scale. 
 
‘Wait and see’ policy   
Adjusting to a changed operational, economic and competitive environment also takes time and 
firms may adopt a ‘wait and see’ policy to assess the new environment and then make use of newly 
acquired operational freedom in adjusting input/output levels. A changed competitive environment 
could also force firms to think beyond the domestic market and start exporting surplus production 
14 
 
as a result of significant investment in capacity additions. The new management of privatized firms 
could wait a few years to learn about new market and competitor experience in exporting. Hence, 
the impact of learning by exporting could only be gauged by utilizing sample spreading over a 
longer time span. This ‘wait and see’ policy could also be the result of a contract signed with the 
government at the time of transfer of management with respect to labour retrenchment. Similarly 
to other countries, the new management of cement-producing privatized firms in Pakistan also 
signed a contract after compensation to the workers of state-owned firms through a ‘golden 
handshake’ (severance scheme). Hence, a longitudinal study, spread over a longer post-
privatization period into the financial and operating performance of privatized firms is more 
appropriate and desirable to observe the full extent of labour adjustments made by the new 
management. 
  
Fiscal impact – compensation of lost revenues of SOEs by direct and indirect tax contributions 
One of the main stated aims of privatization of public sector firms has been to use privatization 
proceeds for the retirement of public debt as well as to reduce unaffordable subsidies. Another aim 
is that the national exchequer would be one of the main beneficiaries of the post-privatization 
improved performance of the privatized firms specifically and industry in general, by collecting 
more taxes due to higher sales and net earnings. This would compensate for the lost government 
revenues from the state-owned enterprises after transfer of ownership to the private sector. By 
focusing only on a few years of the post-privatization performance of privatized firms, we may 
not be able to capture the long-term tax contribution in the national kitty for the privatized firms 
in particular and industry in general.  
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Testing of economic theory in the presence of violations of assumptions 
There have been an ever increasing number of studies on the impact or effect of privatization 
since early 1980s. A simple search on Google scholar with the phrase “effect of privatization” 
with all these words present in the title produced 111 studies and changing the word ‘effect’ to 
‘impact’ produced 408 studies. A sensible and interesting question in this regard is that why still 
there is a need to perform another study on the same topic. We believe that a Pakistani case study 
could contribute in the literature more due to a number of institutional, cultural and sociological 
factors. In modelling the consequences of change of ownership and other reforms, there are often 
underlying assumptions based on these factors which in some case are not valid in a particular 
case of a developing country such as Pakistan. In particularly, it is assumed that institutional 
framework is such that it promotes competition and price wars which results in competitive 
prices and fair play in terms of entry and exit.  Strong but impartial institutions such as regulatory 
bodies, and legal system help control firms anticompetitive behaviour. The competition helps in 
achieving optimal production levels leading to an improvement in productive efficiencies. 
Similarly, cultural and sociological factors provide a setting which is conductive for fair play, 
and transparency as well free movement of labour and capital. 
 
Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005) however, noted that these assumptions in relation to a developing 
country could not be true and identified six differences between developing and developed 
countries. These include competitive vs imperfect of product, labour, managerial labour and 
capital markets (competitive vs monopolized product market leading to distorted prices, hiring 
and firing of workers through competitive process vs appointments through connections, well-
functioning and transparent capital market vs an under developed market and appointment of 
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trained managers through competitive processes vs weak managers appointed through 
patronage), well understood and protected property rights vs unclear and inadequate protection 
of property rights alongside under developed business ethics and lastly high standard of honesty 
in government operations vs cronyism and corruption by democratic and non-democratic 
governments. Pakistan, being an underdeveloped country, suffered from all those weaknesses 
mentioned above but has made significant progress since 1999 onward in particular and 1991 in 
general. In the following, we briefly explain some of these developments in this regard. 
 
Product, capital labour, and managerial markets: Immediately after the initiation of 
privatization policy, the government in the next fifteen years introduced a number of 
accompanying reforms including strengthening of regulatory bodies to control anticompetitive 
behaviour of privatized and non-privatized firms, reduction in labour union pressure and further 
privatization of state-owned firms and thus letting the private business to appoint an efficient 
labour and manager based on competitive wages and capital market regulation by removing  
restrictions on capital markets. This has led to an increase in the number of companies listed on 
country stock exchanges alongside market capitalization and liquidity. Despite all these 
developments, Pakistani press is full of news items on forming of cartels in cement, automobile, 
cooking oil, sugar and banking products. Capital market in general and stock markets in 
particular are often accused of insider trading and underhand deals. Transaction costs are still 
high compared to developed economies. The hiring and firing of workers and manager in 
government corporations is still based on political connections. Female labour force 
participation is low compared to western standards. Cultural and religious issues are dominants 
in discouraging female participation in the labour market. The presence of conglomerates and 
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family run businesses in the private sector is hindering the competitive product, labour and 
managerial markets. 
 
Private property rights, business conducts and ethics and transparency in government 
operations:  Significant progress has been made in regard to private property rights in Pakistan.  
The courts and legal system has become more effective and efficient but still has a backlog of 
litigation cases related to ownership and other financial disputes. An improvement in the 
regulatory structure has helped to improve the standards of business conduct but cases of 
exploitation of labour and consumers are common. Transparency in government dealings varies 
depending upon which political party or dictatorship is in power. Pakistan is still counted among 
the most corrupt countries in the world which has resulted in the high cost of doing business. 
Religious terrorism and a precarious security situation have significantly hindered a government 
capacity to implement a strict code of business ethics for the last fifteen years in particular as 
well as discouraging foreign firm’s entry. 
       
In the presence of above mentioned issues alongside partial progress in Pakistani context, the 
study of a long term impact of privatization for a developing country such as Pakistan is an 
interesting read and a good addition in existing empirical literature.  
 
3. Evidence so far on the impact of broader reforms and privatization  
The literature on the question of ownership changes and their impact on performance has been 
updated regularly but is not conclusive. Some early studies in the 1980s and 1990s suggested that 
performance under private ownership was superior and supported the positive impact of 
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privatization. Among the widely cited studies supporting this conclusion are: Boardman and 
Vining (1989), Megginson et al. (1994), Galal et al. (1994), Barberis et al. (1996), Newbery and 
Pollitt (1997), Boubakri and Cosset (1998), Claessens and Djankov (1999) and D’Souza and 
Megginson (1999). Other authors such as Fare et al. (1985), Atkinson and Halvorsen (1986), Kay 
and Thompson (1986), Sappington and Stiglitz (1987), Wortzel and Wortzel (1989) and Laffont 
and Tirole (1991) do not consider public ownership an impediment to firms’ efficient operation. 
  
By using a relatively longer sample period, more effort has gone in to evaluating the financial and 
operational performance of firms in the pre- and post-privatization period since 2000 (see Table 
1). This includes single as well as multi-country industry case studies. Similarly to earlier studies, 
the empirical literature does not seem to be conclusive. A significant number of authors such as 
Shirley and Walsh (2000), Megginson and Netter (2001), Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), 
D’Souza et al. (2002), Djankov and Murrell (2002), Wei and Varela (2003), Sun and Tong (2003), 
Li and Xu (2004) and Arocena and Oliveros (2012) concluded that firms under private ownership 
performed better. In contrast to this, some studies, such as those by Sall and Parker (2001), Saygili 
and Taymaz (2001) and Wang (2005), came to the opposite conclusion. Hence, it could be argued 
that although there is a vast international body of literature on the public-private efficiency 
comparison and the privatization effect itself, it lacks conclusiveness in terms of a long-lasting 
impact on firms’ financial and operational performance.  
In contrast to the ever-increasing worldwide literature, remarkably few studies have looked into 
the ex post performance of the privatized manufacturing firms in Pakistan. Notable among these 
are the studies by Aftab and Khan (1995), Naqvi and Kemal (1997) and more recently by Ghulam 
and Jaffry (2015). Aftab and Khan found that, contrary to the general perception, change of 
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ownership resulted in less employment loss. Naqvi and Kemal, however, concluded that the effect 
of privatization on efficiency, output and price levels was uncertain. Ghulam and Jaffry (2015), 
using data on the Pakistani cement industry, concluded that the industry had experienced good 
long-run productivity growth due to technological progress. This study, however, ignored the 
financial aspect of the reforms and privatization. Further, sources of productivity growth were 
limited to efficiency and technical change. We extend the findings of the above-mentioned study 
significantly by estimating more sources of productivity growth alongside bootstrapping as well 
as financial performance evaluation and comparing these findings with a sample of firms from five 
Pakistani industries operating under a similar economic and regulatory framework. 
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Table 1: Some widely cited studies on post-reform/privatization performance evaluation 
Authors Sample industry/firms           Main results 
Financial performance evaluation studies 
Bishop & Kay (1989) Manuf. and non-manuf. firms   Privatized firms grew faster than public sector firms 
Adam & Mistry (1992) Manuf. firms from developing countries Privatization improved profitability and efficiency 
Megginson et al. (1994) 41 firms from 15 countries  Strong performance after privatization 
Galal et al. (1994) 12 companies inc. public utilities Welfare gains in 11 out of 12 privatized companies analysed  
Villalonga (2000) Longitudinal study of 24 Spanish firms Performance improved after privatization. Decline is transitional 
Harper (2001) 178 privatized Czech firms  Profitability and efficiency decreased  
Boubakri & Cosset (2002) 16 African privatized companies Performance did not improve 
Wei et al. (2002) 208 Chinese privatized firms Performance improved 
Boubakri et al. (2004) 50 firms from 10 Asian countries  Performance improved 
D’Souza et al. (2005)  23 developed countries 129 share-issue  Performance improved 
Boubakri et al. (2005) 230 companies from developing countries Performance improved 
Chen et al. (2006) 1078 Chinese companies of IPO privatization  Decline in profitability and asset utilization  
Mathur & Banchuenvijit (2007) 103 privatized firms Performance improved 
Farinós et al. (2007) Spanish privatized firms  Performance improved 
Naceur et al. (2007) 95 GCC countries’ privatized firms  Performance improved 
Li et al. (2007) 155 Chinese firms Profitability declined  
Cook & Uchida (2008) 166 companies from developing countries Deterioration in performance among privatized utilities  
Ghosh (2008) 99 Indian firms Performance improved 
Huang & Wang (2011) 127 Chinese firms  Performance improved 
Zhang et al. (2012) 364 Chinese firms Profitability decreased. Output and operating efficiency increased 
Productivity/efficiency evaluation studies (since 2000) 
Saal & Parker (2000) UK water and sewerage firms 1985–99/10 Post-privatization efficiency improved due to better regulations rather than privatization per se 
Rossi (2001) Argentinian gas distribution companies 1993–97/8 Post-privatization efficiency improved due to technological progress and increase in efficiency 
Sall & Parker (2001) UK water and sewerage firms 1985–99/10 Post-privatization no productivity improvement despite significant reductions in workforce  
Chirwa (2001) Malawian manufacturing firms (private and privatized) 1970–97/6 Improved technical efficiency for all ownership firms after privatization 
Saygili & Taymaz (2001) Turkish cement firms (public, private, privatized and mixed) 1980–95/38 Change of ownership had no effect on technical efficiency 
Estache et al. (2002) Argentinian and Brazilian railways companies 1994–99/16 Productivity improved after privatization 
Jones & Mygind (2002) Estonian manufacturing firms 1993–97/666 Positive impact of privatization. Private firms more productive than state-owned firms 
Resende & Faceanha (2002) Brazilian telecommunication companies Jul. 98 and Dec. 99 Study documented no improvement in efficiency in post-privatization period 
Cullinane & Song (2003) Korean container terminal 1978–96/5 Privatization improved container productive efficiency 
Chirwa (2004) Malawian public, private and privatized firms 1970–97/15 Technical efficiency improved after privatization. Competition and structural adjustment important 
Brown et al. (2006) Romanian, Hungarian, Ukrainian and Russian manufacturing firms 1986–92/30647 Positive impact of privatization on productivity (Romania, Hungary and Ukraine), negative for Russia 
Okten & Arin (2006) Turkish privatized cement companies 1983–99/22 Improved labour productivity after privatization 
Amess & Roberts (2007) Polish manufacturing cooperatives 1988–93/4525 Firms improved productivity. Competition important 
Sall et al. (2007) English and Welsh water and sewerage firms 1985–2000/10 Did not show any improvement in productivity due to efficiency decline. Find technical progress 
Asaftei et al. (2008) Romanian manufacturing firms 1995–2003/avg. 1106 Privatized firms did not produce any better than public enterprises 
Saal & Parker (2000) UK water and sewerage firms 1985–99/10 Post-privatization efficiency improved due to better regulations rather than privatization per se 
Chirwa (2001) Malawian manufacturing firms (private and privatized) 1970–97/6 Improved technical efficiency for all ownership firms after privatization    
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4. A brief history of the Pakistani privatization programme 
In contrast to the Western world, the rationale for privatization in Pakistan was not based 
on ideology, but rather on the necessity of the circumstances. By the end of the 1980s, a 
significant number of state-owned firms were making losses, leading to a significant 
increase in subsidies and budget deficit. Government fiscal space was gradually becoming 
limited due to a rising demand for public investment in crumbling infrastructure, debt 
servicing and defence outlays. This can be judged by the fact that by the end of 1987–88, 
the fiscal deficit reached 8.5 per cent of GDP. By selling state-owned enterprises, it was 
expected that the government would be able to use subsidies allocated previously to these 
enterprises for building physical and social infrastructure. As a result of selling loss-making 
public enterprises, it was believed that private owners of these firms would address the 
inefficiencies in the production and distribution process and improve financial 
performance. 
   
The first serious attempt to privatize state-owned enterprises was made in the early 1990s 
when the government introduced a mass privatization programme in 1991/92, which led to 
the selling of 66 manufacturing firms and two commercial banks to the private sector (see 
Table 2). A second phase of privatization was completed during 1993-96, when 
privatization of 20 manufacturing firms, one bank and one power generation plant and the 
selling of 12 per cent of shares in Pakistan Telecommunications Ltd. were completed. In 
the third phase, the efforts to privatize the remaining SOEs and financial institutions were 
intensified during 1999–2007. This time, however, the privatization programme was one 
of many initiatives to revive the economy. One of those initiatives included abolishing the 
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culture of industrial patronage to promote competition and productivity. The privatization 
progress under this round included an 80 per cent sale of a national commercial bank. By 
the end of 2006, roughly 85 to 90 per cent of firms earmarked for the sale had already been 
sold to the private sector.  
 
Table 2: Details of privatized manufacturing firms 
Sector/ 
Firm 
Year Sector/ 
Firm 
Year Sector/ 
Firm 
Year Sector/ 
Firm 
Year 
Automobile 
 
Cement 
 
Chemical 
 
Cooking Oil 
 
Al-Ghazi Tractors  1991 Maple Leaf Cement 1992 National Fibres  1992 Fazal Vegetable Ghee 1991 
National Motors  1992 Pak Cement 1992 Kurram Chemicals 1992 Associated  1992 
Millat Tractors  1992 White Cement 1992 Pak PVC  1992 Sh Fazal Rehman 1992 
Baluchistan Wheels  1992 D.G. Khan Cement 1992 Sind Alkalis  1992 Kakakhel  1992 
Pak Suzuki 1992 Dandot Cement 1992 Antibiotics  1992 United  1992 
Naya Daur Motors  1993 Garibwal Cement 1992 Swat Elutriation 1994 Haripur Vegetable Oil 1992 
Bolan Castings 1993 Zeal Pak Cement 1992 Nowshera PVC 1995 Bara Ghee Mills 1992 
Engineering 
 
Kohat Cement 1992 Swat Ceramics  1995 Hydari  1992 
Karachi Pipe Mills 1992 National Cement 1995 Ittehad Chemicals 1995 Chiltan Ghee Mills 1992 
Pioneer Steel 1992 General Ref.  1996 Pak Hye Oils 1995 Wazir Ali  1992 
Metropolitan Steel  1992 Wah Cement 1996 Ravi Engineering  1996 Asaf   1993 
Pakistan Switchgear 1992 Associated Rohri 2003 Nowshera Chemicals 1996 Khyber Vegetable 1993 
Quality Steel 1993 Thatta Cement 2004 National Petrocarbon 1996 Suraj Vegetable Ghee  1993 
Textile Machinery 1995 Mustehkam Cement  2005 
  
Crescent Factories  1993 
Indus Steel Pipe 1997 Javedan Cement 2006 
  
Bengal Vegetable 1993 
      
A & B Oil  1993 
      
Dargai Vegetable 1997 
      
Punjab Veg. Ghee 1999 
      
Burma Oil 2000 
      
E&M Oil Mills 2002 
      
Maqbool Oil 2002 
      
Kohinoor Oil Mills 2004 
      
United  2005 
 Source: Privatization Commission (PC), Government of Pakistan 
 
Starting from 1996, the government also started focusing on financial reforms and the 
establishment of a regulatory framework. Accounting standards were refined to make them in line 
with international standards. The state central bank role, in regulating the banking industry, was 
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strengthened. Other important reforms included stock exchange reforms, setting up and 
strengthening competition authorities, and strengthening the role of security and exchange 
commission etc. As a result of these far-reaching broader reforms, including privatization, the 
economy witnessed an impressive turnaround for at least a few years and the GDP growth peaked 
at 8 per cent in 2004 from the mere 3 to 4 per cent recorded in the previous ten years or more. 
Since then, however, a change of government focus and unsatisfactory progress in addressing the 
structural issues of the economy have stalled the economic growth trajectory. This has indeed led 
to an increase in unemployment levels and political unrest in the country. 
 
The privatization of public utilities, banks and the airline has been ‘work in progress’ for a very 
long time now due to the less than satisfactory progress of the already privatized SOEs and a strong 
resistance from labour lobbies and the civil society. There had been little progress in this regard 
after almost completing three years of the current government who have put the speedy 
privatization of the remaining SOEs in their election manifesto as well as focusing on the 
development of the private sector. The lack of published empirical evidence on the subsequent 
performance of state owned firms compared to competitor private sector firms has also contributed 
to the confusion over the actual benefits of the Pakistani privatization programme. This study 
would, hopefully, contribute significantly to the ongoing debate on the effectiveness of reforms 
introduced a long time ago. 
   
5. Development of the Pakistani cement industry 
Cement manufacturing is a well-established industry in Pakistan, accounting for about 5.5 per cent 
of the total industrial production and representing 1.4 per cent of GDP. In 1972, after 
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nationalization of the industry by the pro-socialist government, all the cement manufacturing 
plants were placed under the Board of Industrial Management. In response to the continuing 
shortages, the government lifted the ban on private investment in 1978 and announced an incentive 
package for private sector participation. A further deregulation in the cement industry started in 
1984, when the first attempt was made by the state-run holding company State Cement Corporation 
of Pakistan (SCCP) to sell a percentage of the SCCP shares in two state-owned cement 
manufacturing firms. This was supplemented by allowing the managers of the state-owned firms 
to set output prices and source inputs without significant interference by the government. In 
1991/92, under a ‘mass privatization’ programme, the government sold six cement manufacturing 
firms through a sealed bidding process. The privatization of four more firms was delayed but 
completed later on in 1996, 1999 and 2003 due to the non-payment of bidding money.  
 
In a new and evolved institutional set-up after privatization and broader reforms, the government 
has no control on the production and selling of cement as against eighty five per cent market share 
before. A significant number of new privately owned firms had entered the market immediately 
after the start of the privatization policy, and some older firms had been acquired by competitor 
firms leading to consolidation of the industry. The existing firms had also undertaken a significant 
capital investment to expand their production capacities and replace old wet process production 
technology.  
 
The cement manufacturing and distribution is being administered and monitored by a trade 
association, the All Pakistan Cement Manufacturers Association (APCMA). The industry has 
become the fifth largest exporter of cement in the world and has been exporting a significant 
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quantity of cement to Afghanistan, Iraq, India, Djibouti, Tanzania, Sri Lanka and South Africa. 
The industry is providing employment for 250,000 workers directly and indirectly. The APCMA 
estimates the tax contributions towards the national kitty to be in the region of 30 billion Pakistani 
rupees. These are significant contributions against the backdrop of a struggling economy due to 
political turmoil, corruption, mismanagement, misplaced government priorities and regional 
terrorism. 
 
Despite these developments, there are some serious allegations regarding the APCMA forming an 
tacit collusion and, in effect, replacing the state monopoly before the initiation of the privatization 
policy. The charge sheet included unreasonable price hikes maintained subsequently by a reduction 
in quantity supply that resulted in underutilization of the existing production capacity. There had 
been investigations by the competition authorities and as a result of these investigations, fines and 
warnings were issued to cement manufacturing firms. The APCMA, however, maintains that the 
members’ cooperation is aimed at an adequate and fair supply across the country. Interestingly, 
despite a series of allegations and counter allegations, an internal study, carried out by the 
Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP), was unable to find any clear collusion practice.  
 
6. Measurement of the impact of reforms on firms’ performance 
A comprehensive evaluation of the impact of reforms on the industry would require a detailed 
assessment of firms’ post-privatization pricing strategies, building of counterfactual scenarios, 
financial performance analysis, social cost benefit analysis and firms’ response to the shift in 
technology frontiers and the catching up of best-practice firms. We carried out all these 
assessments, but due to the scope of this study, we focus only on the pre- and post-reform financial 
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performance evaluation and firms’ response to catching up with the industry benchmark as well as 
a shift in the frontier technology. The question of counterfactual scenarios is addressed by 
comparing privatized firms with those firms that were not privatized as well as those that were set 
up in the private sector and remained so throughout our sample period. We also compared the 
performance of the cement industry with other similar manufacturing industries to support our 
industry-specific explanation of the financial and productivity outcomes. In the following, we 
discuss the basic framework of our preferred methodologies in greater detail.  
   
6.1. Financial performance evaluation 
Similarly to the significant and ever-rising number of studies that have generally appeared in 
finance journals, we focus on five dimensions of financial performance: firms’ profitability, net 
income efficiency (labour use efficiency in generating a surplus (profit)), output (inflation-adjusted 
sales/revenues), capital investment and the debt/leverage position. In the following, we briefly 
discuss these dimensions and explain the proxies that are used to evaluate the impact of reforms 
including privatization.  
 
Profitability: One of the main objectives of privatization has been to make firms profitable to: 1) 
cover their operating expenses, 2) be able to make new investments, and 3) provide a reasonable 
return on shareholders’ equity. Hence, we would like to find out whether this goal has been 
achieved for the group of privatized firms over shorter, medium and longer time periods. There 
are a number of proxy ratios that could serve as a profitability measure. However, following the 
wider practice in the empirical literature on this issue, we use the return on assets, which measures 
a firm’s ability to manage its assets profitably.  
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Efficiency: It is commonly argued that public enterprises suffer from innate inefficiency because 
they fail to utilize the available human resources efficiently. A sense of job security under public 
sector ownership alongside non-competitive in-cash wages and payments is perhaps considered 
the leading cause of poor labour use by managers and bureaucrats. After privatization, it is 
commonly argued that new private management would utilize labour resources more efficiently. 
Further, due to job insecurity and efficiency wages, workers would pay more attention to the 
production activities, which would result in improving labour productivity. We test this prediction 
by measuring net income efficiency, defined as net income, divided by the number of employees. 
This expresses the net surplus generated per employee during the year.  
 
Output: It is expected that through improved incentives, more flexible financing opportunities, 
increased competition and a greater opportunity for entrepreneurial skills, real sales will increase 
after privatization (Megginson et al., 1994). However, after an extensive study of the performance 
of the Egyptian state-owned enterprises, Boycko et al. (1993) argued that effective privatization 
will lead to a reduction in output since the government will no longer be able to force and bribe 
managers to maintain a high level of output. We examine these competing predictions by using 
inflation-adjusted sales volume for post- and pre-privatization periods.  
 
Investment: It is expected that a privatized firm will increase investment spending, for a variety of 
reasons, immediately after transfer of ownership. Firstly, privatized firms now have more options 
to source funds, including the equity market as well as from private finances. Secondly, 
immediately after privatization, these firms are expected to perform well in terms of earning power, 
which would provide them with an opportunity to utilize internal cash as well as capital market 
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finances by floating new shares. Thirdly, these firms are usually sold primarily to established 
businesses in different industrial sectors with the ability to exploit the rising product demand by 
borrowing relatively easily in financial markets. Fourthly, investment in the upgrading of plants 
could be unavoidable due to years of financial stress during the state ownership period, which 
often led firms to defer even the most routine maintenance tasks, while not replacing the least 
efficient production technology or adding new capacities. A proxy ratio capital investment divided 
by net sales is computed and used to test the patterns in investment spending. 
 
6.2. Measure of productivity growth 
We closely follow the presentation of Wheelock and Wilson (1999) and Rezitis et al. (2009) in 
explaining our methodology. We assume that firms are operating in a competitive environment 
and want to maximize output subject to given inputs. Let’s consider the number of 𝑁 firms using 
𝑝 inputs in producing 𝑞 output over 𝑇 time period. Let’s treat x ∈ ℝ+
𝒑
 as an input vector and y ∈
ℝ+
𝒒
 as an output vector of the sample firms. Further, let’s say (x𝒊
𝒕, y𝒊
𝒕) represents the input and 
output vector of the sample firm i at time t. We can use the Shephard (1970) output distance 
function for firm i at time t+1, relative to the technology at time t as: 
 
𝐷𝑡+1(x𝑖
𝑡, y𝑖
𝑡) ≡ 𝑖𝑛𝑓{𝜃 > 0|y𝑖
𝑡 ∕ 𝜃 ∈ 𝑡+1(x𝑖
𝑡)} 
                                                          (1) 
We can derive three distance functions from the above equation (1): (i) 𝐷𝑡(x𝑖
𝑡, y𝑖
𝑡) a measure of 
efficiency relative to contemporaneous technology; (ii) 𝐷𝑡(x𝑖
𝑡+1, y𝑖
𝑡+1) a measure of the firm’s 
position at time t+1 to the boundary of the production set at time t; and (iii) 𝐷𝑡+1(x𝑖
𝑡, y𝑖
𝑡) a 
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normalized measure of distance from the ith firm’s position in the input/output space at time t to 
the boundary of the production set at time t+1 in the hyperplane where inputs are constant. 
Empirically, 𝐷𝑡+1(x𝑖
𝑡, y𝑖
𝑡) and 𝐷𝑡(x𝑖
𝑡+1, y𝑖
𝑡+1) can be less than, equal to or greater than one, while 
𝐷𝑡(x𝑖
𝑡, y𝑖
𝑡) is likely to be less than or equal to one. The estimates of the above distance function (1) 
are generally obtained through linear programming by assuming the scale of the technology 
(constant/variable). 
 
The three distance functions discussed above were used by Simar and Wilson (1998b) and Zofio 
and Lovell (1997) to decompose the Fare et al. (1989, 1992 and 1994) Malmquist index to estimate 
the change in the total factor productivity (TFP) of firms over time. Changes in the values of the 
index are captured by two sources: the shift in the firm’s position relative to the production frontier 
over time (either through efficiency change or catch-up), and the shift in the production frontier 
over time (technical change or technological advancements). This index could be represented by 
the following: 
?̂?(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = [
?̂?𝑣
𝑡2(x𝑖
𝑡2 , y𝑖
𝑡2)
?̂?𝑣
𝑡1(x𝑖
𝑡1 , y𝑖
𝑡1)
] × [
?̂?𝑐
𝑡2(x𝑖
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𝑡2⁄ )
?̂?𝑐
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                                                                    (2) 
where xi is the vector of inputs, yi is the vector of output and subscripts c and v are constant and 
variable returns to scale production technologies. Distance functions are estimated for two adjacent 
years (t1 and t2). According to equation (2), Malmquist productivity index ?̂?(𝑡1, 𝑡2) is the 
combination of four components, namely pure efficiency change (PureEff), scale efficiency 
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change (Scale), pure change in technology (PureTech) and the change in the scale of the 
technology (ScaleTech). Hence, productivity can improve due to better use of resources 
(PureEff ), operating at optimal scale (Scale) or improvement in the use of technology 
(PureTech or ScaleTech). Malmquist productivity index values greater than one would indicate 
an improvement (growth) and less than one a decline. The same applies to four components of 
productivity as well.  
 
Bootstrapping of productivity indices 
The idea of bootstrapping is to address the issue of the sensitivity of sample composition in relation 
to the efficiency scores. These resampled data, drawn from the observed data, are subsequently 
used to get repeated estimates of productivity. In this way, the approximation of the sampling 
distribution of the estimators is achieved through the empirical distribution of the simulated 
estimates. We follow Simar and Wilson’s (1998a) bootstrapping method of the Malmquist 
productivity index. Bootstrapping allows us to assess the ‘null hypothesis’ of no change in 
productivity. We use 2000 draws for the resampling. If the 95 per cent upper and lower confidence 
interval contains unity, then we will be unable to reject the null hypothesis and the estimate is 
considered as not significantly different from one at the 5 per cent significance level 
(improvement/decline is statistically insignificant). When the confidence interval does not include 
unity, we conclude that the estimate is significantly different from unity (improvement/decline is 
statistically significant). An analogous procedure is used for the 90 per cent confidence interval, 
and the inferences are drawn at the 10 per cent significance level. Further, the significance of each 
component of productivity estimates is determined in a similar way. 
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7. Data and sources 
We employ a panel data set of the Pakistani cement manufacturing firms during the period 1986 
to 2011. Our sample firms represent more than 95% of the industry. Our sample firms also 
represent three distinct ownerships type: state-owned, privately owned and privatized (formerly 
state-owned). We use firms’ annual reports and data provided by the Pakistani Ministries for 
income and expenditure details as well as balance sheet items. This firm-specific information is 
used in the computing of financial ratios for financial performance evaluation. For firms’ 
productive performance, we use data on firms’ input use and output again extracted from firms’ 
annual reports and other sources. We closely follow Ghulam and Jaffry (2015) in this regard in 
choosing of inputs and output for the cement manufacturer firms.  
 
By using the relevant indices, output and input, variables in current prices are converted to constant 
prices of output and inputs. The firm’s output is approximated by total gross sales and the real 
output/sale is worked out by deflating the nominal sales by the cement price index. Our output 
variable in values rather than quantity is similar to Bandyopadhyay (2011) and Tsckouras and 
Skuras (2005). The four inputs used in our study are the number of workers, fixed assets, 
expenditures on energy and fuel, and a residual category of expenditures on raw and packing 
material. Some authors used total man days instead of the number of workers. We do not have 
access to this data. Furthermore, the total man days proxy would be misleading in our case due to 
the poor law and order situation and strikes. Nonetheless, our measure is similar to Riccordi et al. 
(2012) and Ghulam and Jaffry (2015).  
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The accounting measure of net fixed assets, which comprises the book value of property, plant and 
equipment, is used to capture the heterogeneity in production technology. We expect a higher value 
of these fixed assets for those firms that are using new advanced technology compared to the 
historical lower book value of old technology acquired a long time ago. Our measure is similar to 
Bandyopadhyay (2011). Fuel and energy account for more than 50 per cent of the production costs 
in the manufacturing of cement. We follow Saygili and Taymaz (2001) in using expenditures on 
fuel and energy and include this in our inputs combination. Similarly, expenditures on raw material 
are similar to Saygili and Taymaz (2001) and account for more than 18 per cent of the production 
cost. Real values of fixed capital, fuel expenses and raw material are calculated by deflating these 
accounts by the GDP deflator, fuel price index and raw material price index.  
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of the variables used in firms’ productivity estimation 
     Notes: N stands for number of observations calculated as firms*years. 
 
 
Table 3 in particular shows descriptive statistics of inputs and output used in our study to derive 
productivity estimates and their sources. By looking at the table, it is clear that we have a 
significant heterogeneity in our sample of firms. The total number of observations for the whole 
sample period, after excluding a few outliers, is 407 with an average number of roughly 15 to 16 
firms per year. The estimation of Malmquist productivity estimates and its components using 
Variable Scale N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Output value Millions Rs. 407 2859.45 3209.53 16.59 24038.63 
Capital Millions Rs. 407 2535.85 2904.94 14.38 15140.4 
Labour Numbers 407 716.51 412.05 110 2550 
Material Millions Rs. 407 231.24 167.56 2.49 1142.25 
Fuel Millions Rs. 407 735 582.82 8.46 4669.1 
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equation (2) requires, first, calculation of the DEA-based cross-period eight distance functions by 
using data on inputs and output from two adjacent years. The fact that we are interested in yearly 
estimates means we could end up using too few observations.  
 
A DEA estimator is known to be statistically less reliable when encountered with a smaller number 
of decision-making units (DMUs) or firms due to low convergence rates. Boussofiane et al. (1997) 
and Dyson et al. (2001) argued that to get meaningful estimates, the sample should at least fulfil 
the specific criteria and that the number of firms should be at least 2*i*o, where i*o is the product 
of the number of inputs and outputs. In our case, the use of a DEA estimator with four inputs and 
single outputs would require a set of at least eight firms for each sample year. Our case study of 
firms fulfils this criterion reasonably well as our sample has more than 12 firms for all pre- and 
post-reform cross periods. 
 
8. Empirical findings 
8.1. Pre and post reforms and privatization financial performance evaluation  
Table 4 shows the Wilcoxon test results of the firms’ profitability, efficiency, output approximated 
by real sales and capital expenditure. Starting with profitability, it appears that on average, except 
for privately owned firms, industry as well as a group of privatized and public (state-owned) firms 
experienced a long-run decline in profitability in the overall post-1992 period. This decline is 
statistically significant both for the industry and privatized firms. The profitability did improve 
marginally for privatized firms in the first seven years after privatization (1992–98), but the 
increase is not statistically significant. Public sector firms’ profitability decreased after 1992 but 
the differences between pre- and post-1992 values are not statistically significant. Interestingly, 
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the profitability margin of the group of private firms was statistically significantly higher in the 
post-1992 period. These firms started earning higher returns immediately after the reforms and 
privatization (during 1992–98) and continued doing so in the subsequent 13 years too. Hence, it 
could be argued that a change of ownership did not make firms more profitable but perhaps some 
other factors could be responsible for the better performance of firms established and working 
under private ownership.  
 
Similarly, Table 4 shows that except for public sector firms, net income efficiency improved in 
the overall post-1992 period, but the improvements are not statistically significant. This is true for 
the first seven years as well as the next 13 years except for privatized firms. Interestingly, 
privatized firms’ income efficiency statistically significantly decreased during the longer post-
privatization period (1999–2011) and the decline was quite substantial. Hence any improvement 
in efficiency for the group of privatized firms in the initial post-privatization honeymoon period 
was lost within a few years.  
 
The Wilcoxon test shows that real median sales increased for the entire industry as well as for the 
group of private firms over the longer post-reform period as well as the period 1999–2011 and the 
increase is statistically significant too. For the overall industry and the group of private firms, most 
improvement came during the longer post-reform period (1999 to 2011). The increase for 
privatized firms is very marginal during the immediate period of reforms but is statistically 
significant nonetheless. Interestingly, privately owned firms experienced a marginal but a 
statistically significant decline during this period. For the group of firms that remained in the public 
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sector until the time they were eventually privatized, there was a decline in output (real sales) over 
short as well as longer post-reform time periods. But this decline is not statistically significant. 
 
Years of underinvestment under public ownership led to severe maintenance issues alongside 
limited production capacity. It was expected that new management would make substantial capital 
investment in upgrading technology and capacity addition. The test results contained in Table 4 
show that for the overall post-reform period as well as for the immediate first seven years, the 
group of private and privatized firms experienced an increase in capital spending but the 
improvement is statistically significant only for the privatized firms. On average, privatized firms 
increased their capital investment spending from -0.71% to 2.1% of their sales after privatization 
and this significant increase came immediately after privatization. Interestingly, the firms that were 
not privatized initially recorded a statistically insignificant decline in capital spending during this 
period. For the longer-run post-reform period (1999 to 2011), overall industry as well as the group 
of private and privatized firms experienced improvement in capital spending but statistical 
significance is observed only for the entire industry.  
 
Based on this above simple financial analysis, we can conclude that for the group of privatized 
firms, except for capital expenditure, profitability, net income efficiency and real sales did not 
improve over the longer run of the post-broader reforms and change of ownership time period. 
Hence, the only positive outcome from the change of ownership appears to be a significant increase 
in capital expenditures perhaps due to the unavoidable replacement of old technology and 
production capacity expansion so that these firms could compete with larger already privately 
owned firms. Broadly speaking, these financial performance trends for the group of privatized 
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firms are not generally similar to competitor private sector firms who have done well in terms of 
profitability, efficiency and output. But when privatized firms are compared with those firms that 
were not privatized in the first phase of the mass privatization programme, their performance does 
not appear to be inferior. However, this superior performance could have been due to sample 
selection bias, where more profitable and relatively efficient firms were privatized first.  
 
Table 4: Firms’ financial performance evaluation  
 
Pre- 
reform 
period 
 +20 years 
post-reform period 
 +7 years 
post-reform period 
 +13 years 
post-reform period 
 (1) 
1986- 
1991 
 
 (2) 
1992- 
2011 
 
(3) 
Z 
(4) 
Prob. 
 (5) 
1992-
1998 
 
(6) 
Z 
(7) 
Prob. 
 (8) 
1999-
2011 
 
(9) 
Z 
(10) 
Prob. 
Industry 
 
 
   
        
Profitability 11.508  4.834 4.949 0.000  7.6565 2.932 0.003  4.451 5.419 0.000 
Net income efficiency 0.022  0.055 -0.822 0.411  0.053 -0.610 0.542  0.063 -0.830 0.407 
Real sales 15.514  21.764 -4.096 0.000  18.721 -1.535 0.125  24.219 -4.996 0.000 
Capital expenditure -0.103  -0.113 -2.047 0.041  -0.945 -1.358 0.175  1.144 -2.177 0.030 
Privatized firms 
 
 
   
        
Profitability 7.655  4.805 2.625 0.009  8.873 0.762 0.446  3.333 3.728 0.000 
Net income efficiency 0.041  0.048 1.257 0.209  0.062 -1.391 0.164  0.003 1.950 0.051 
Real sales 20.024  21.103 -1.419 0.156  21.845 -2.210 0.027  19.647 -1.290 0.197 
Capital expenditure -0.707  2.069 -1.708 0.088  1.781 -1.711 0.087  2.546 -1.340 0.180 
Publicly owned firms  
 
 
   
        
Profitability 7.355  3.296 0.829 0.407  3.565 0.444 0.657  3.454 1.107 0.268 
Net income efficiency 0.069  -0.020 0.999 0.318  -0.019 1.050 0.294  -0.015 0.530 0.596 
Real sales 21.783  16.064 0.510 0.610  16.920 0.370 0.712  15.990 0.530 0.596 
Capital expenditure 1.840  -2.756 0.987 0.324  -2.756 0.710 0.478  -2.515 1.069 0.285 
Privately owned firms  
 
 
   
        
Profitability 5.778  7.638 4.846 0.000  11.920 3.640 0.000  7.355 4.964 0.000 
Net income efficiency 0.021  0.095 -1.147 0.251  0.086 -1.239 0.216  0.085 -1.037 0.300 
Real sales 18.279  22.624 -4.267 0.000  17.440 -2.249 0.025  24.542 -4.721 0.000 
Capital expenditure -0.977  3.678 0.768 0.443  6.607 0.441 0.659  3.732 0.829 0.407 
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 above present the median values for pre- and post-privatization periods. Before privatization covers the period between 1986 and 1991 and 
after privatization covers the period between 1993 and 2011. For the tests of the significance of median change, we used the Wilcoxon rank sum test (with its Z 
statistics) as our principal statistic. The probability column shows the significance level for the null hypothesis that the difference between two median values is zero. 
Ratios are calculated by using the following formulas: 
Profitability = (net profit before tax + financial expenses/total assets)*100 
Net income efficiency = net profit after tax/number of employees 
Real output = gross output value/cement price index  
Capital expenditure = (book value of operating fixed assets (current year) - book value of operating fixed assets (previous year)]/net sales)*100 
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Investigating the impact of broader reforms and privatization on the financial performance of 
other similar industries that experienced privatization 
An interesting and sensible question in this regard, however, is: was this relatively disappointing 
profitability and efficiency performance of privatized firms compared to already privately owned 
firms limited to the cement industry or has it also been a widespread trend for all those other 
Pakistani manufacturing firms who have experienced privatization? More specifically, attributing 
bad or good financial performance purely to a change of ownership in the cement industry could 
be misleading for a variety of reasons, such as technology constraints, location disadvantages and 
local input/output market conditions and macroeconomic environment etc. To address these issues 
and for the sake of sensitivity analysis, we compare the cement industry’s financial performance 
against other industries that had experienced a change of ownership alongside other broader 
reforms during almost the same time period. We assembled and analysed data on four other 
manufacturing industries – chemical, automobile, cooking oil and engineering – and subsequently 
compared the financial performance of these industries with our case study, the cement industry.  
 
Similarly to the cement industry, we first computed financial ratios for the entire industry and then 
compared privatized firms with their peer groups from the public sector firms who were not 
privatized in 1991/92 for a variety of reasons, as well as with those that were set up under private 
ownerships and remained so, using the Wilcoxon test. For this exercise, we restrict our sample 
period and analysis to the first ten years of the post-reform and privatization period (1992–2001) 
due to significant operational, financial and time constraints in collecting and compiling such 
detailed historical financial data. Similarly, due to the heterogeneity in firm sizes across different 
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industries and data availability issues, we modified some of our financial ratios discussed above. 
All these modifications were also applied to the cement industry to make a valid comparison.  
 
Profitability in this sensitivity analysis exercise is measured by returns on sale, efficiency is 
measured by asset efficiency represented by firms’ sales to asset ratio, capital expenditure ratio is 
measured by capital expenditure to total asset and output is measured by real sales value. Our final 
matching sample comprises 98 firms from the four Pakistani manufacturing industries mentioned 
above. These include 23 firms from the automobile industry (comprising 6 privatized, 9 state-
owned and 8 private), 38 firms from the chemical industry (4 privatized, 12 state-owned and 22 
private), 20 firms from the cooking oil industry (5 privatized, 10 state-owned and 5 private) and 
17 firms from the engineering industry (comprising 2 privatized, 9 state-owned and 6 private sector 
firms). The post-privatization and broader reforms period is divided into two subperiods. The first 
period covers the initial impact comprising the first five years (1992–1996) and the second period 
covers the ten years from 1992 to 2001.  
 
The estimates contained in Table 5 show that except for privatized firms in the automobile 
industry, firms belonging to all other four industries did not improve their profitability in the short 
or the long run of the post-reform period. In fact, they recorded a statistically significant decline 
in profitability. The significant improvement in the profitability recorded for the privatized 
automobile firms should also be looked at in the context of industry structure and market 
conditions. The automobile manufacturing firms have a clear market advantage due to the 
government protection policy of local manufacturing of vehicles due to import restrictions. The 
market is monopolized by a few firms and these firms have long been accused of exploiting their 
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dominant position. Firms already set up in the private sector did relatively well over five and ten 
years in the post-reform and privatization period. Although improvement in profitability is not 
statistically significant it is better than in privatized and state-owned firms. Hence, this confirms 
that the disappointing profitability performance of privatized firms was not limited to cement 
manufacturers but was widespread. 
 
The story concerning financial efficiency was very similar to that of profitability for the group of 
privatized firms. The privatized firms belonging to the cement, engineering and cooking oil 
industries experienced a statistically significant decline in efficiency over ten years in the post-
privatization period. The group of privatized firms belonging to the chemical and automobile 
industry, however, witnessed an increase in efficiency over ten years but this increase is not 
statistically significantly different from the pre-privatization period. The group of private firms 
belonging to the automobile and chemical industries performed much better both in the short and 
longer time periods in contrast to firms from the cooking oil industry. Interestingly, state-owned 
firms belonging to the chemical industry did well in the short and the long run. Hence, based on 
the above analysis, relatively speaking, one can conclude that the group of privatized firms, 
irrespective of the industry they belonged to, did not do well in terms of efficiently using their 
resources during the post-privatization shorter and longer time periods. 
 
For output measured by real sales value, except for the chemical industry, privatized firms in all 
other industries experienced a decline during the first five and ten years in the post-reform and 
privatization period. This decline is significant, though, only for the engineering and cooking oil 
industries. Interestingly, private firms, except for the automobile and cement industries, recorded 
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a decrease in output (real sales). This decrease, in particular, is also statistically significant for the 
cooking oil and chemical industries. The increase for automobile firms over the shorter and longer 
time periods is an interesting one, as is the case for state-owned firms belonging to the chemical 
industry. Interestingly, for the automobile and cooking oil industries, a significant decline is 
recorded for the state-owned firms during the same time periods.  
 
Table 5: Comparative financial performance of manufacturing industry  
 
Privatized firms  Privately owned firms   Publicly owned firms 
 
+ 5 years 
post reforms  
+ 10 years 
post reforms 
 + 5 years 
post reforms  
+ 10 years 
post reforms 
 + 5 years 
post reforms  
+ 10 years 
post reforms 
   
 
  
 
   
Profitability 
         Cement industry increased declined *  increased* declined  declined declined 
Automobile industry increased increased*  Increased increased  increased increased 
Chemical industry declined declined *  Increased increased  declined declined 
Engineering industry declined* declined*  declined declined  declined declined 
Cooking oil industry declined* declined*  declined* declined  declined* declined*    
 
  
 
   
Asset efficiency 
         Cement industry declined declined*  declined declined*  declined increased 
Automobile industry declined increased  increased* increased*  declined* declined* 
Chemical industry increased increased  increased* increased*  increased* increased* 
Engineering industry declined* declined*  increased increased  declined* declined* 
Cooking oil industry declined declined*  declined* declined*  increased* increased    
 
  
 
   
Real sales 
         Cement industry increased declined  increased* increased  declined declined 
Automobile industry declined declined  increased* increased*  declined* declined* 
Chemical industry increased increased  declined* declined*  increased* increased* 
Engineering industry declined* declined*  declined declined  increased increased 
Cooking oil industry declined* declined*  declined* declined*  declined* declined*    
 
  
 
  
 
 Capital expenditure 
         Cement industry increased* declined  declined declined*  increased declined 
Automobile industry declined declined  declined declined  increased increased 
Chemical industry increased increased  declined declined  declined declined 
Engineering industry declined declined*  increased declined  increased increased 
Cooking oil industry increased* increased*  declined declined  declined declined    
 
  
 
     
 
  
 
  
Notes: * indicates improvement/decline or no improvement compared to pre-reform period is statistically significant.  
 
As far as the modified capital investment ratio is concerned, privatized firms from the cement 
industry improved their investment in the post-privatization short-run time period (first five years). 
Similarly, in contrast to profitability and efficiency, firm investment in capacity additions and 
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technology upgrades increased for the next ten years subsequent to reforms for the firms from the 
cooking oil industry that experienced a change of ownership from the public to the private sector. 
This increase is statistically significant too. There was, however, a completely different scenario 
for privatized engineering industry firms over a longer time period. Private firms in general did 
not invest more and, in fact, experienced a decline in almost all four industries over a shorter and 
longer time period. However, this decline is not statistically significant except for the cement 
industry over the ten-year post-reform period. For state-owned firms, there appears to be a mixed 
trend, but all those changes are statistically insignificant nonetheless.  
 
Investigating the impact of broader reforms on the financial performance of those industries that 
did not experience privatization 
To further isolate the long-run impact of broader reforms including change of ownership from 
industry-related factors, we computed the above-mentioned ratios and subsequently performed a 
Wilcox test to observe the impact of broader reforms on the financial performance of those 
industries that did not experience a change of ownership due to privatization. These two industries 
are energy and steel manufacturing. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 6. Starting 
with the profitability results, it is clear that for both industries, we are unable to find any 
statistically significant improvement or decline during the five- and ten-year post-reform periods. 
For the steel manufacturing firms, there is evidence of improvement but this was merely catching 
up from the downward trend (as the ratio is still negative).  
 
The capital expenditure story is very similar where there is some evidence of improvement but not 
enough to make the change positive year on year. Interestingly, changes are statistically significant 
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in most of the cases. Looking at the efficiency indicator, there is evidence of improvement during 
the immediate as well as the longer post-reform period but this improvement is not statistically 
significant. For real sales or output, again, there is evidence of increase during the immediate as 
well as the relatively longer post-reform period but these improvements are not statistically 
significant. Hence, broadly speaking, the post-reform financial performance outcomes for these 
two industries are not any better than the other five industries discussed above irrespective of the 
choice of indicator and the post-reform time periods.  
 
Table 6: Financial performance of state-owned firms with no privatization effect 
 
Period Scenario 
 
Return on  
sale 
 
 
Asset 
efficiency 
 
Output 
 
 
Capital 
expenditure 
  
 
     
Energy 1986–91 Before 2.11 121.09 9991.54 -2.25  
1992–96 After 1.03 133.73 11672.43 -2.06  
 Z 0.05 -1.30 -0.54 -2.36  
 Prob. 0.96 0.19 0.59 0.02  
 
     
Steel 1986–91 Before -13.06 29.38 257.00 -0.95  
1992–96 After 0.64 38.41 19297.68 -1.22  
 Z 0.21 -0.75 -0.48 -2.28  
 Prob. 0.83 0.45 0.63 0.02  
 
     
Energy 1986–91 Before 2.11 121.09 9991.54 -2.25  
1992–01 After 1.63 150.77 23169.99 -1.90  
 Z 1.16 -0.06 -0.35 -2.05  
 Prob. 0.25 0.95 0.73 0.04  
 
     
Steel 1986–91 Before -13.06 29.38 257.00 -0.95  
1992–01 After -3.61 38.33 14879.27 -0.59  
 Z -2.87 0.51 -0.13 -0.74  
 Prob. 0.00 0.61 0.90 0.46  
 
     
Notes: return on sale = (net profit after tax/net sales)*100; return on assets = (net profit before tax/total assets)*100; asset efficiency = (net sales/total assets)*100; 
capital expenditure = ((operating fixed assets [t] - operating fixed assets[t-1])/total assets)*100; output = net sales/(CP). Outlier removed.  
 
8.2. Productivity estimates 
Table 7 reports our empirical estimates for the Malmquist productivity index (ΔMalm), efficiency 
changes (Eff) and its components [pure efficiency change (PureEff) and scale efficiency 
(Scale)], technological change (Tech) and its components (pure technical change (PureTech) 
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and changes in the scale of technology (ScaleTech)). The Malmquist indices, their components 
and confidence intervals were computed using the FEAR software package with R developed by 
Wilson (2008).  
 
By applying bootstrap procedures, we compute upper and lower confidence intervals. These 
confidence intervals are then used to determine the statistical significance of productivity estimates 
and its components. According to Simar and Wilson (1999), the sample variance of the normal 
Malmquist productivity values {?̂?(b)i, (t, t+1) } for b= 1, ..., B is s2(b)i and the estimated mean 
square error (MSE) of biased corrected Malmquist productivity ?̂?_corri,(t, t+1) is 4s2(b)i. Simar 
and Wilson argued that the ‘original’ estimates ?̂?(b)i,(t, t+1) rather than the biased corrected 
estimates ?̂?_corri,(t, t+1) should be used if s2(b)i >
1
3
bias(?̂?i,(t,t+1). In our case, this is true and we 
present our original productivity estimates in our presentation of results contained in Table 7. 
 
In the presentation of our productivity estimates, we first estimate and present productivity 
estimates for adjacent years and then the geometric means of different time periods encompassing 
the pre- and post-privatization and reforms period (similarly to financial analysis, the years 1987 
to 1991 cover the pre-privatization period and 1992 onward post-privatization). The year 2007 was 
an exceptional year in Pakistan due to elections, political demonstrations, strikes and an overall 
political and economic instability; hence, we also calculate and report results by excluding the year 
2007 from the post-privatization period. Again similarly to financial analysis, we also present these 
estimates for different ownership firms, such as public, private and privatized, to highlight the role 
of ownership in the management of resources.  
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8.2.1. Separating the short- and long-term impact of privatization on productivity 
Table 7 shows that industry as a whole recorded 2.8 per cent growth per annum (p.a.) during the 
period 1987–2011. Technological progress or innovation contributed mainly to this growth in 
productivity suggesting that productivity growth did not come from ‘catch-up’ but only from 
‘frontier shift’. The growth in technological progress was 3.3 per cent p.a. and the pure technical 
change seems to be the only source of improvement. The insignificant contribution of efficiency 
improvement is similar to that in our financial analysis and Saygili and Taymaz (2001), Rossi 
(2001) and Resende and Facanha (2002), who, while assessing the impact of privatization, were 
unable to find evidence that privatization improves firms’ efficiency.  
 
Table 7: Total factor productivity and its sources 
 
Productivity change  Efficiency change  Technical change  
Malm  Eff PureEff Scale  Tech PureTech ScaleTech   
 
   
 
    
Entire industry 
1987–2011 1.028  0.995 1.001 0.994  1.033 1.030 1.004 
1987–1991 0.993  0.998 0.996 1.002  0.996 0.990 1.004 
1992–2011 1.037  0.995 1.003 0.992  1.042 1.040 1.004 
1992–2011a 1.058  0.991 1.000 0.991  1.067 1.058 1.007 
1992–1999 1.005  0.983 0.999 0984  1.021 1.016 1.005 
1999–2011a 1.096  1.002 1.011 0.991  1.094 1.081 1.009   
 
   
 
     
 
   
 
    
Privatized firms 
          
1987–2011 1.010  0.987 0.996 0.991  1.024 1.020 1.004 
1987–1991 0.991  0.995 0.995 1.000  0.995 0.994 1.001 
1992–2011 1.022  0.986 0.998 0.989  1.036 1.027 1.007 
1992–2011a 1.040  0.982 0.992 0.990  1.059 1.044 1.009 
1992–1999 0.993  0.980 0.985 0.994  1.013 1.009 0.999 
1999–2011a 1.096  1.007 1.016 0.991  1.088 1.070 1.008   
 
   
 
   
 
Publicly owned firms 
1987–1999l 1.007  0.979 1.003 0.976  1.028 1.012 1.013 
1987–1991 0.997  1.000 0.995 1.004  0.996 0.988 1.003 
1992–1999 1.016   0.965 1.010 0.955  1.052 1.029 1.020   
 
   
 
     
 
   
 
    
Privately owned firms 
1987–2011 1.047  1.003 1.005 0.998  1.044 1.048 0.999 
1987–1991 0.997  0.998 0.998 1.000  0.998 0.986 1.013 
1992–2011 1.047  1.000 1.004 0.996  1.046 1.050 0.999 
1992–2011a 1.065  0.996 1.002 0.994  1.070 1.067 1.004 
1992–1999 1.012  1.006 1.005 1.000  1.006 1.009 1.001 
1999–2011a 1.099  1.004 1.012 0.993  1.094 1.091 1.003   
 
   
 
   
Notes: a. Excluding 2007. Value of M greater (less) than 1 indicates increase (decrease) in productivity. Growth is calculated by deducting 1 from the values.  
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By looking at the pre-privatization period (1987–1991), industry witnessed a 0.70 per cent p.a. 
decrease in productivity (represented by a 0.20 per cent efficiency drop and 0.40 per cent 
technological regress). Our results in pre-privatization, are very similar to Amess and Roberts 
(2007) who documented a 1 per cent decline in productivity in the pre-privatization period. In 
contrast to this, in the post-privatization periods, industry achieved 3.7 per cent growth p.a. during 
1992–2011 with technological advancement being the sole contributor (4.2 per cent growth p.a.). 
By excluding the year 2007, we see even more impressive growth figures in the post-privatization 
period. 
 
After dividing the post-privatization period into two further sub-periods, one for the initial impact 
of privatization (1992–1999) and the second for the relatively longer post-privatization and 
reforms period (1999 to 2011), we note that for the sub-period 1992–1999, industry does not show 
any productive progress. Any improvement in technological progress was offset by the decline in 
efficiency. Efficiency decline was primarily due to scale inefficiency and technological progress 
was achieved by pure technical change. But since 1999, industry has done exceptionally well, with 
productivity growth being 9.6 per cent p.a. and technological progress contributing 9.4 per cent. 
Hence, conclusions from the industry averages seem to lead us to believe that significant growth 
in post-privatization was achieved due to innovations in technology (technological advancement 
shifting the frontier) and to some extent driven by factor accumulation and possibly due to an 
increased management effort alongside significant capital investment in acquiring new advanced 
technology, replacing outdated production processes and significant capacity additions in the first 
few years of the post-reform/privatization period and subsequently. The estimates further show 
that the improvement in productivity would have been more if firms had not experienced a decline 
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in scale efficiency due to suboptimal use of capacity after accumulating excess capacity between 
1999 and 2011. 
 
8.2.2. Separating the short- and long-term impact of privatization on the productivity of different 
ownership firms  
Interestingly, in contrast to the nearly 3 per cent p.a. productivity growth in industry, privatized 
firms attained an overall growth of only 1 per cent p.a. during the sample period, mainly due to 
2.4 per cent p.a. in technological progress despite a 1.3 per cent decline in efficiency. Rather 
disappointingly, these firms witnessed a decrease in efficiency, which is opposite to the general 
consensus that privatization improves efficiency. This decline was due to both contributors such 
as not operating at optimal level and not being able to catch the frontier. The decline, however, 
was minimum. These firms did not show any improvement under public sector ownership (1987–
1991), but a 2.2 per cent growth p.a. after change of ownership during 1992–2011. The growth in 
productivity was achieved due to the technological development of 3.6 per cent p.a. despite an 
efficiency decrease of 1.4 per cent. These estimates are 4 per cent growth p.a. after excluding 2007 
with an efficiency reduction of 1.8 per cent and technological progress of 5.9 per cent p.a. During 
a relatively longer post-reform period, these growth rates are 9.6 per cent p.a. with a technological 
progress contribution of 8.8 per cent. For the post-privatization sub-period (1992 to 1999), 
similarly to the industry average, the group of privatized firms did not show any 
improvement/decline in productivity. An improvement in the technological growth was offset by 
the decline in efficiency. The decline in efficiency was perhaps due to operating at suboptimal 
level due to demand conditions as well as an increase in production capacity. 
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None of the firms that remained in the state ownership showed any improvement in productivity 
between 1986 and 1999. Improvement in technology was offset by the decline in efficiency. 
Improvement in technology was achieved through pure technological change as well as a change 
in the scale of technology. Efficiency decline was primarily due to a decrease in scale efficiency 
(operating at suboptimal level). In terms of sub-periods, firms under state ownership did not 
perform any better from 1987 to 1991. Interestingly, an impressive technological progress of more 
than 5 per cent was swallowed up by the efficiency decline due to operating at suboptimal level. 
Pure technical change and scale technical change contributed equally towards technical progress 
for these state-owned firms during 1992–99.   
 
The discussion of privatized firms as well as those who remained under state ownership on their 
own after 1991/92 is important but a better conclusion can be drawn when these firms are 
compared with competitor firms operating in a similar economic and regulatory environment. As 
discussed before, firms that started as private enterprises and remained so during our sample period 
are good candidates for such comparison. Private firms in our sample achieved an impressive 
growth of 4.7 per cent p.a. during 1986 to 2011, primarily due to the contribution to growth by 
technological advancement (4.4 per cent). During the pre- reform period, no significant 
productivity growth was achieved, while in the post-privatization period, this group of firms 
recorded 4.7 per cent growth p.a. with the contribution of technological progress being 4.6 per cent 
(negligible efficiency increase). After excluding 2007, these estimates are 6.5 per cent growth p.a. 
with a 7.0 per cent p.a. technological progress contribution. These estimates are 9.9 per cent growth 
p.a. during 1999 to 2011 with technological progress of 9.4 per cent p.a. (no contribution from 
efficiency gains again). Any improvement in the catching up of frontier was offset due to not 
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utilizing the available capacity efficiently. Hence we can conclude for this group of firms, which 
are similar to the privatized group, that growth in the post-privatization/deregulation period was 
achieved due to innovations and technological advancements and they were certainly better than 
state-owned (current and former) firms. 
 
One of the main criticisms of productivity estimates derived from the DEA distance function has 
been that these estimates could be unreliable due to data outlier issues as well as the familiar 
convergence problem due to the low number of firms (decision-making units (DMUs in DEA 
literature)). We understand and recognize the impact of these two issues on our productivity 
estimates given the fact that our productivity estimate conclusions appear to be completely 
different compared to financial analysis. Hence, as a sensitivity analysis, we also used a parametric 
method in estimating production function using the same inputs and output. These parameter 
estimates are subsequently used to drive productivity estimates for the entire industry.  
 
These parametric method based productivity estimates stratified by different ownerships are 
presented in Appendix A. Ignoring the magnitudes of the productivity growth rates, the qualitative 
conclusions remain the same as discussed above, thereby confirming the validity of our 
productivity estimates and related pre- and post-reform and privatization conclusions. In an effort 
to obtain more understanding and robustness of our cement industry total factor productivity 
estimates and its components, we carried out further sensitivity analysis. The outcomes of this 
exercise are presented and discussed in the following subsection.      
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8.2.3. Comparison of cement industry productivity estimates and conclusions with other industries 
An interesting question could be that whether improvement in productivity in the cement industry 
was limited to one particular capital-intensive industry such as cement manufacturing or it was 
widespread as a result of the broader reforms including privatization. Alternatively, was the long 
run improvement in the cement industry productivity due to broader reforms including 
privatization or some other factors such as economic conditions, political environment and 
industrial activity etc.? The technical progress accomplished by the cement industry could have 
been as a result of compulsion in existing firms to make investment in technology upgrades after 
the transfer of ownership and capacity additions due to rising competition levels or the entry of 
new firms that would normally opt for acquiring new, relatively superior technology to compete 
with already established firms. By compiling data on the same inputs and output, we estimated 
similar DEA distance functions to those mentioned in the methodology section and then 
subsequently computed productivity estimates and its components (sources). Similarly to financial 
performance analysis, we focus on four industries (automobile, chemical, engineering and cooking 
oil). In the following, we evaluate these estimates of total factor productivity and its components 
for all four industries as well as by partitioning the sample into state owned, privatized and 
privately owned firms. 
 
The productivity estimates presented in Table 8 indicate that, except for smaller-size and less 
capital-intensive industries such as cooking oil, all the other three industries experienced no 
improvement in productivity and in fact a decrease over five as well as ten years in the post-reform 
and privatization time period. This decline in productivity is also established after dividing the 
sample firms into different ownerships such as public, privatized and private. Interestingly, in the 
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industry where there is evidence of significant productivity gains (7% p.a. for cooking oil), in 
complete contrast to the cement industry, improvement in productivity has been as a result of the 
catching up of the efficiency frontier (efficiency improvement) rather than the shifting of the 
frontier (technological progress). In fact, this industry experienced a technological regress over 
this ten-years post-reform period.  
 
Table 8: Comparative productivity growth of the manufacturing industry firms 
  Productivity change   Efficiency change   Technical change 
 
Malm 
 
Eff PureEff Scale 
 
Tech PureTech ScaleTech 
           
Automobile industry 
Pre reforms 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
1.02 1.02 1.00 
+5 years post reforms 0.96 
 
1.02 1.00 1.00 
 
0.89 0.89 0.99 
+10 years post reforms 0.98 
 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
0.95 0.96 1.00            
Chemical industry 
Pre reforms 1.00 
 
1.01 1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.02 1.00 
+5 years post reforms 0.99 
 
1.07 1.07 1.00 
 
0.92 0.91 1.00 
+10 years post reforms 0.97 
 
1.02 1.00 1.00 
 
0.97 0.97 1.00            
Engineering industry 
Pre reforms 1.01 
 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
1.09 1.01 1.00 
+5 years post reforms 0.98 
 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
0.90 0.89 1.00 
+10 years post reforms 0.97 
 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
0.94 0.92 1.00  
Cooking oil industry 
Pre reforms 0.93 
 
1.00 1.01 1.01 
 
0.99 1.02 0.99 
+5 years post reforms 1.07 
 
1.15 1.11 1.00 
 
0.89 0.89 0.99 
+10 years post reforms 1.07 
 
1.11 1.10 1.00 
 
0.94 0.93 0.99            
Privatized firms only  
Pre reforms 0.98 
 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
0.99 1.00 0.99 
+5 years post reforms 0.95 
 
1.05 1.00 1.00 
 
0.89 0.90 1.00 
+10 years post reforms 0.99 
 
1.03 1.00 1.00 
 
0.95 0.95 1.00            
Privately owned firms only 
Pre reforms 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
1.02 1.02 1.00 
+5 years post reforms 0.99 
 
1.06 1.05 1.00 
 
0.90 0.91 1.00 
+10 years post reforms 0.99 
 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
0.96 0.96 1.00           
 
State-owned firms only 
Pre reforms 0.98 
 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
0.99 1.00 0.99 
+5 years post reforms 0.96 
 
0.99 1.00 1.00 
 
0.95 0.92 1.00 
+10 years post reforms 0.98 
 
1.00 0.98 1.00 
 
1.00 0.95 1.00                     
Notes: Sample comprises 54 manufacturing firms. 
 
Efficiency improvement is also confirmed for the sample of private and privatized firms. Both 
these groups of firms also experienced negative technical change. Rather disappointingly, this 
negative technical change has been common for all industries and ownership types (current and 
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former, public and private). As a result, the gains in efficiency were offset by a decline in 
technology particularly for two industries (chemical and automobile), while for the engineering 
industry, pure technological regress caused the decline in productivity.  
 
Hence, when the cement industry productivity growth is evaluated in comparison to five other 
similar industries from the manufacturing sector, it could be argued that except for the cooking oil 
industry, the cement industry has done well in the sense that significant technology upgrades have 
led to technological progress for privatized as well as private sector firms over a longer post 
reforms and privatization time period. But it is also true that attributing this productivity growth 
and technological progress to broader reform could be a bit misleading because we have observed, 
at least for three out of five industries, that industry did not make any progress in productivity 
growth despite going through similar types of reforms at the same time (early and mid-1990s). In 
the following discussion comprising qualitative analysis of the cement industry productivity 
estimates and subsequent regression analysis, we discuss the role of the initial conditions at the 
time of privatization and thereafter as well as the firms’ specific factors and economic working 
environments to observe the net effect of broader reforms and privatization for our main case study. 
 
8.2.4. Further explanation of cement industry productivity growth  
In an effort to further investigate the reason behind the significant improvement in productivity for 
the group of private and privatized firms, we link these estimates to firm-specific and industry and 
economic changes subsequent to broader and regulatory reforms. More specifically, these factors 
include total production capacity, ownership type, profitability, investment, export, demand 
condition measured by capacity utilization, financial burden and its impact approximated by 
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financial expenses and size of the firm etc. We first discuss the role of these factors qualitatively 
and subsequently run regression and make inferences. 
  
8.2.4.1. Qualitative explanation of cement producers’ productivity performance 
In an effort to further understand specifically what cement producers did in terms of qualitative 
adjustments immediately after reforms and change of ownership that led to better performance, 
we conducted a comprehensive review of abstracts of the firm’s annual report section of director 
reports related to all those firms of different industries discussed above. We also conducted 
interviews specifically with cement producers’ association representatives. The outcome of this 
exercise could be summerised into four important qualitative adjustments made immediately 
after reforms including a change of ownership which led to the better performance of cement 
producing firms compared to other manufacturing firms discussed above. 
    
1. Changes in human resource management practices 
Prior to reforms and change of ownership, employees in state-owned firms enjoyed excessive 
holidays, less working hours and extraordinary other benefits such as leave of absence, medical 
facilities, holidays, and pensions. The new management of the privatized firms of the cement 
industry in particular got rid of excessive benefits, introduced competitive process in hiring and 
firing, and re-employed more productive and efficient employees who opted for voluntary early 
retirement before the transfer of ownership. Interestingly, contrary to broader claims that 
privatization reduces employment, privatized firms employed more workers after initial 
adjustments. The growth rate of the number of workers remained at 1.35% per annum for 
privatized firms during 1998 to 2011 compared to -3.85% for publically owned firms after 1998. 
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The growth rate in the monthly wage rate was 6.2% and -1.3% for privatized and public owned 
firms during this time period. Hence, the quality of workers became important subsequent to 
change of ownership. These policies played a dual role by first lowering the cost of production, 
and second introducing competition among employees for job protection. 
  
2. Reducing the excessive bargaining power of workers by labour unions 
Firms under public ownership had to endure excessive and unnecessary pressure from labour 
unions. This resulted in less than optimal operating days resulting in higher average cost. Cement 
producers of privatized firms in particular paid greater attention to this issue and labour union 
pressure was minimalized significantly as well as offering monetary incentives and perks to more 
productive employees.  Overall management-labour relations remained fairly stable with the 
exception of two cases.  Public sector employees remained absent from work on the pretext of a 
bad security situation. But after the change of ownership and reforms, this all changed.  
Employees remained reluctant to take days off due to the worry that they would not be paid after 
the union pressure had been reduced significantly. This led to record working days and longer 
working hours. Furthermore, poor law & order conditions in the country impacted all businesses 
in terms of operating days but firms under public ownerships were hit hard due to job security. 
Compared to cement producers, for the other industries we evaluated above, we do not observe 
such significant curtailments in union pressure and subsequent record working days. 
  
3. Maintenance, modernization and rehabilitation of production plants 
Firms operating under public ownership neglected the routine repair and maintenance services 
for years resulting in lower capacity utilization, a reduction in operating days and a 
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postponement in committed supplies. The new management scheduled routine maintenance on 
a priority basis. The price war in particular in the cement industry compared to other industries 
mentioned above led to an urgent need to a technology upgrade for ex public sector firms in 
particular.  Freedom in setting up prices on the other hand resulted in better profitability and thus 
helped firms to opt for Building, Modernization and Rehabilitation (BMR) of existing old 
machinery. Two of the privatized firms in fact implemented BMR immediately after transfer of 
ownership. The subsequent results showed that under BMR programs, firms achieved cost 
efficiency advantages as well as higher operating days. 
 
4. Focus on inventory and working capital management 
The better access to inputs source and superior management of input-output inventory stocks to 
seek windfall gains in a period of uncertain demand, could be vital for efficiency and 
productivity improvement. The availability of sufficient working capital under private 
ownership is important due to the fact that private sector firms do not enjoy default protection 
in particular compared to state owned enterprises who enjoys such facility. The analysis of 
working capital stocks of the privatized cement producer firms clearly indicates that it improved 
immediately after change of ownership. This ensured that the new owners could achieve input 
at more competitive prices by negotiating with suppliers, at the time when publically owned 
firms were locked into supply contracts with other state-owned institutions and corporations. 
This in particular is truer for cement producer firms where inputs purchase is more in bulks 
compared to cooking oil, and ceramics etc. 
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A univariate analysis to further understand the cement industry findings 
A cursory look at Table 9 reveals some interesting facts. Starting with privatized firms, only three 
out of ten firms were in the top ten of outstanding performers in terms of productivity growth. 
Hence, as discussed above, change of ownership per se was not the significant determinant for the 
higher productivity growth reported and discussed before. The profitability and productivity 
relationship shows that five out of the top ten better performing firms were also more profitable. 
Hence, this indicates a relatively weak relationship between these two variables. Similarly, the six 
out of ten worst performing firms were those that have a high capital investment, indicating a 
negative relationship. Exporting status does not translate into better performance (excluding 
exceptional cases of two firms with more than a 15% share of sale from export receipts). There 
appears to be a weak relationship between capacity utilization and productivity growth. The 
estimates show that five out of the ten top performing firms have high capacity utilization.  
 
Similarly, similar could be said of the relationship between the burden of financial expenses and 
productivity growth. It appears that five out of the top ten performing firms also have higher 
financial expenses relative to their total sales. Figures presented in the table reveal a strong positive 
relationship between cement demand and productivity performance. It appears that seven out of 
top ten better performing firms also sold a higher quantity of cement during the sample period than 
other competitor firms. The size of the firm approximated by the production capacity reveals that 
the six firms that have the highest current production capacity were among the bottom ten 
performers, thereby confirming the negative relation between productivity and size of the firm. 
We discuss the role of some of these factors in determining the firms’ productivity growth in 
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greater detail and subsequently model the determinants of productivity using a regression model 
in the next subsection below.  
 
Table 9: Exploring interactions between firm-related factors and productivity  
Firms Average 
productivity 
growth 
() 
 
Rank 
of 
 
Current 
capacity 
(last 
year 
of 
sample) 
Current 
ownership 
 
Profitability 
(ROA) 
Capital 
investment/ 
total sales 
Export 
sales 
as a % 
of 
total 
sales 
Capacity 
utilization 
Financial 
expenses 
as a % 
of 
total 
sales 
Cement 
sales 
quantity 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Associated  1.043 7 6.31 Privatized 0.038 0.742 0.000 0.758 4.234 6.27 
Zeal Pak  0.989 19 17.55 Privatized 0.026 0.126 0.114 0.508 5.357 4.92 
Maple Leaf  1.029 12 36.90 Privatized 0.163 0.389 4.748 0.849 6.553 10.87 
Javedan  0.991 18 6.00 Privatized 0.076 0.280 0.272 0.652 6.512 4.10 
Gharibwal  0.965 20 20.10 Privatized 0.095 0.444 1.409 0.819 4.869 5.02 
Mustehkam 1.023 14 57.00 Privatized 0.097 0.088 0.327 0.823 4.396 6.07 
Thatta  1.043 7 4.50 Privatized 0.076 -0.065 4.881 0.825 9.542 3.04 
Kohat  1.038 10 26.85 Privatized 0.161 0.146 6.299 0.766 4.875 4.51 
Dandot  1.007 15 5.04 Privatized 0.049 0.110 0.103 0.861 10.248 3.20 
D.G. Khan  1.025 13 40.20 Privatized 0.123 0.284 4.635 0.913 6.783 15.82 
Pakland/Dewan  1.045 6 29.40 Private 0.228 0.471 1.617 0.904 7.500 5.72 
Cherat  1.032 11 6.49 Private 0.155 0.071 9.177 0.961 3.927 6.31 
Dadabhoy  0.999 16 5.98 Private 0.169 0.319 1.457 0.854 11.221 3.70 
Attock  1.075 4 17.10 Private 0.268 0.128 9.595 0.902 0.867 11.26 
Essa  0.995 17 4.05 Private 0.061 0.419 11.487 0.787 6.174 2.72 
Fecto  1.057 5 7.80 Private 0.137 0.003 6.029 0.881 2.721 6.15 
Fauji  1.094 3 10.47 Private 0.097 0.333 9.629 0.846 12.302 8.97 
Lucky  1.104 2 38.87 Private 0.126 0.272 17.281 0.612 2.576 26.86 
Pioneer  1.043 7 11.86 Private 0.057 0.132 6.374 0.696 8.714 8.03 
Chakwal  1.179 1 24.00 Private 0.056 -0.072 25.080 0.815 11.842 21.02 
 
 
8.2.4.2. Modelling the determinants of total factor productivity growth and its sources 
(multivariate analysis)  
The univariate analysis presented above does not control for factors that could have jointly 
impacted on the firms’ productivity. The productivity of the firms could improve/decline due to a 
variety of factors alongside change of ownership and broader reforms. The main aim of this section 
is to jointly empirically evaluate the impact of individual firm-specific factors, as well as temporal 
changes in the firms’ operating and economic environment, on firms’ productive performance 
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discussed individually in the previous section. Firm-specific variables include profitability, 
capacity utilization, share of financial expenses in total revenues, size of the firm measured by the 
production capacity, share of export sales in total volume of sales, firm leverage ratio and ratio of 
capital investment to sales (level and square).  
 
To take into account local and national demand conditions, we introduce the quantity of cement 
dispatched/sold, estimated population size of the country and public investment as a percentage of 
GDP. The significance of investment by the government for the cement industry is extremely 
important due to a low and decreasing investment in the private sector since Pakistan joined the 
war on terror. To account for the role of international macroeconomic activity, we introduce 
foreign remittances as a percentage of GDP. To observe the impact of change of ownership, we 
use a dummy variable privatized equal to ‘1’ after transfer of ownership and zero for state 
ownership status. Our final regression model with productivity (𝑦) for firm i in year t takes the 
following form: 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡   =  𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3
∗ 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +𝛽8 ∗ 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽11 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡  + 𝛽12
∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽13 ∗ 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
                                       (3) 
As discussed in the methodology section, Malmquist productivity estimates in our case are 
estimated by using different distance functions derived by the DEA estimator. Simar and Wilson 
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(2007) pointed out that these estimates could suffer from serial correlation. Hence, the estimation 
of the above specified model by standard techniques such as OLS method, censored regression or 
panel data regression has been proven to be inappropriate (see Simar and Wilson’s (2007) study 
in this regard). By following Brissimis et al. (2008) alongside others, we use Simar and Wilson’s 
(2007) bootstrapped estimator to carry out valid statistical inferences on regression estimates.  
 
We are mindful of the fact that some of the above independent variables in equation (3) could be 
endogenously determined and hence not considering this adequately could lead to less robust 
estimates. We tested for each of the above regressors for endogeneity and concluded that 
profitability was indeed an endogenously determined variable. We followed Brissimis et al.’s 
(2008) methodology to address the issue of endogeneity. Subsequently, we ran a series of 
regressions with different specifications of the above model. For the sake of comparison, we also 
report regression results based on panel data random effect estimates alongside endogeneity-
corrected Simar and Wilson (2007) bootstrapped estimates2.                            
 
The regression coefficient of profitability in Table 10 does not suggest that all those highly 
profitable firms are necessarily more productive too. It could be that those firms that are able to 
realize high profitability would be able to spend money from internal and external sources on 
technology upgrades and R&D to boost future productivity and could in fact achieve technological 
progress. But a lack of efficient management of the resources at hand may not have led to an 
                                                 
2 For further technical details and estimation procedure, please see Simar and Wilson (2007) and Brissimis et al. 
(2008). 
59 
 
improvement in efficiency and this in turn would not translate into an improved overall 
productivity level.  
 
Bansak et al. (2007) investigated the relationship between technology, capital spending and 
capacity utilization and concluded that technological change resulted in a decrease in capacity 
utilization in the USA manufacturing industry. Our measure of capital expenditure is the difference 
between current year operating fixed assets, which predominantly includes value of lands, 
equipment and machinery compared to previous years deflated by total sales of the current year. 
It is true that since 2004, significant investment has been made in the upgrading of technology and 
capacity additions and privatized firms have taken the lead in this context. It is clear from the 
regression coefficient attached to the variable privatized that change of ownership alone may not 
be sufficient to improve the factor productivity. The privatized regression coefficient is 
insignificant irrespective of specification or the method of estimating the regression parameters. 
The analysis performed in the previous section showed that out of the top five firms that added the 
highest production capacity, only one was among the top five performers. Hence, it is not 
surprising that we have a statistically significant negative coefficient of capital expenditure and 
the relation is robust with respect to different specifications.  
 
The impact of a rising burden of financial expenses on firms’ efforts to improve productivity is 
evident from the positive and statistically significant coefficient attached to this variable. It appears 
that significant capacity additions during our sample period by various firms may have been, in 
part, financed by bank loans and it would be expected that firms use resources at hand effectively 
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to achieve maximum output. This is expected, given the fact that the improvement in productivity 
estimates as discussed above was as a result of new technology and innovation.  
 
The size of the firms could serve as a proxy for market power as well as potential realization of 
economies of scale. We have concluded above that an improvement in productivity was attributed 
to positive technical change. Hence, we believe that size of the firm does indeed indicate local 
market power. The negative signs indicate that a higher value of firm size reduces productivity 
and technical progress. This negative relation is similar to Aghion et al. (2002), who surveyed 
firms in 25 transitional economies and found that competitive pressure enhances the performance 
of new as well as old firms. Total cement dispatches could be treated as a proxy for local demand 
and regional market power due to high transportation cost in the exporting of cement from one 
area to another. A statistically significantly positive coefficient attached to this variable confirms 
the positive demand side effect. Similarly, our regression results also indicate that a rising 
population helps to improve productivity due to, perhaps, an increase in product demand leading 
to higher capacity utilization.  
 
Finally, we ran the above regression with efficiency and technical change as dependent variable 
on almost the same variable. Appendix B contains these regression coefficients, which shows that 
broadly speaking, the sign and significance are similar to the productivity estimate coefficients 
reported in Table 10, with few exceptions. Similarly to productivity growth, firms’ profitability is 
not linked to technical change. Firms’ capital investment and size negatively impacts on both 
efficiency and technical progress. For efficiency, this coefficient is insignificant, though. Financial 
burden measured by financial expenditure, demand conditions and population all positively 
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contribute to technical progress, efficiency and total factor productivity. For population, though, 
in contrast to productivity and technical change, the regression coefficient for efficiency is 
statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 10: Determinants of productivity change 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
?̂? se ?̂? se ?̂? se ?̂? se 
1. Panel data random effect estimates 
 
Profitability a  0.1148 0.0819 0.1145 0.0813 0.1147 0.0809 
  
Capital expenditure b  -0.0805*** 0.0296 -0.0806*** 0.0295 -0.0499*** 0.0156 -0.0517*** 0.0157 
Capital expenditure c  0.0084 0.0071 0.0085 0.0070 
    
Privatized d  -0.0171 0.0242 -0.0172 0.0241 -0.0153 0.0239 
  
Export sale share e  -0.0005 0.0014 -0.0005 0.0014 
    
Capacity utilization f  -0.0032 0.0905   -0.0088 0.0903 0.0149 0.0924 
Financial expenses g  0.0028* 0.0016 0.0028* 0.0015 0.0031** 0.0015 0.0029* 0.0015 
Firm size h  -0.0483 0.0525 -0.0468 0.0313 -0.0453 0.0523 -0.0503 0.0521 
Leverage i  0.0030 0.0021 0.0030 0.0021 0.0032 0.0021 
  
Demand j  0.0672 0.0511 0.0657** 0.0285 0.0635 0.0505 0.0701 0.0503 
Population k  0.0018** 0.0008 0.0019** 0.0008 0.0016** 0.0007 0.0001 0.0015 
Public investment l  
  
  
  
-0.0101 0.0135 
Foreign remittances m  
  
  
  
-0.0121 0.0188 
2. Simar and Wilson (2007) bootstrapped estimates 
Profitability a  0.0385 n 0.1528 0.0309 n 0.1540 0.0337 n 0.1478 
  
Capital expenditure b  -0.0841*** 0.0297 -0.0851*** 0.0296 -0.0521*** 0.0159 -0.0536*** 0.0158 
Capital expenditure c  0.0089 0.0070 0.0090 0.0070 
    
Privatized d  -0.0169 0.0240 -0.0188 0.0241 -0.0142 0.0237 
  
Export sale share e  -0.0007 0.0013 -0.0011 0.0017 
    
Capacity utilization f  -0.0299 0.0727   -0.0498 0.0702 -0.0556 0.0711 
Financial expenses g  0.0030** 0.0015 0.0032** 0.0015 0.0034** 0.0015 0.0030** 0.0015 
Firm size h  -0.0795*** 0.0285 -0.0705*** 0.0241 -0.0871*** 0.0255 -0.0958*** 0.0365 
Leverage i  0.0029 0.0021 0.0029 0.0021 0.0033 0.0021 
  
Demand j  0.1002*** 0.0219 0.0920*** 0.0169 0.1072*** 0.0185 0.1161*** 0.0335 
Population k  0.0019** 0.0008 0.0021*** 0.0008 0.0016** 0.0007 0.0013 0.0011 
Public investment l  
  
  
  
0.0003 0.0102 
Foreign remittances m  
  
  
  
-0.0071 0.0182 
Notes: a. net profit/total assets; b. capital expenditure/sale; c. square capital expenditure/sale; d. dummy variable = 1 when firm privatized; e. value of export sale/total 
sale value; f. actual production/total production capacity; g. financial expenses/total income; h. firm technological production capacity; i. long-term loans/total equity; 
j. quantity of cement sold; k. total estimated population; l. as a % of GDP; m. as a % of GDP; n. instrumented variable. Instruments include operating in south region, 
Herfindahl index, interest rate, dividend yields, number of times government changed, dummy variable for period 1992–98, dummy variable for period 1999 to 2011, 
dummy variable for firm is new technology user, net income per employee, age of firms, gross fixed capital formation, GDP gro wth rate, assets per employee, loans 
to construction sector and exchange rate. Overidentification and weak instrument tests were performed to check the robustness of instruments. 
*** significant at 1%. 
** significant at 5%. 
* significant at 10%. 
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9. Conclusions 
The main objective of this study was to observe the long-run impact of broader reforms including 
privatization on firms’ financial and operational performance. We assembled historical financial 
and operational data on the Pakistani cement industry and analysed a series of financial ratios 
alongside estimation of productivity growth for the industry. To get a better sense of the results 
and sensitivity analysis, we also collected data on other similar firms from four industries. 
Financial analysis results revealed that except for significant capital investment in technology 
upgrading and capacity additions, privatized firms’ performance over the longer-run post-
reforms/privatization period has been rather less than satisfactory. Peer firms from the private 
sector, in particular, have done much better in terms of long-term profitability and output (sale) 
trend. Interestingly, the weaker profitability performance of privatized firms has not been limited 
just to cement manufacturers but has been very widespread across four other manufacturing 
industries. This could have been for a variety of reasons, including an increase in financial 
expenses to meet technology upgrade demands and the resultant bank borrowing to finance the 
investment alongside government taxation policy etc.  
 
The story for long-run post-reform/privatization productive performance is not that disappointing 
compared to financial performance. We conclude that the industry recorded a decent productivity 
growth during the sample period. Overall, productivity growth in the industry has been around 2.8 
per cent per annum, coming mainly from technological progress. In the post-privatization period, 
firms focused on technological development more than the efficient use of resources (catching up). 
Most of the progress was achieved during the post-reform/privatization period compared to the 
decline before the reform period. Interestingly, the initial impact of the privatization was 
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negligible; however, the industry witnessed a significant productivity growth in the long run. This 
highlights the fact that in some cases, the benefits of privatization in terms of productivity increase 
could be realized in the long run if the economic conditions became conducive to the industry and 
the management had the required freedom after reforms to benefit from favourable conditions. The 
privatized firms did not do well compared to the industry averages, recording only 1 per cent 
growth p.a. during the whole sample period and 2 per cent during the post-privatization period. 
The immediate impact of reforms was also minimal. Contrary to the broader consensus that 
privatization improves efficiency, a relatively lower growth for the group of privatized firms was 
achieved as a result of the decrease in efficiency. 
 
The group of private firms, however, outperformed the other two ownership firms, recording a 
growth of more than 4 per cent p.a. during the sample period and roughly 5 per cent p.a. post 
reform due to the technological progress. Thus, a relatively favourable macroeconomic 
environment, further deep regulatory and financial reforms introduced later alongside better 
quality of management rather than ownership per se were the main drivers of growth. Our 
multivariate regression results confirm this. Although privatized firms did not outperform privately 
owned firms, this relatively modest growth has to be taken into account in the context of non-
existent pre-privatization productivity growth and is definitely better than those firms who 
remained under public ownership after the mass privatization event of 1922. This relatively better 
performance of privatized firms could also send a positive signal to potential new entrants without 
the fear of renationalization of the industry. All this could lead to higher competition levels and 
vertical integration in the industry.  
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The rising cement export levels since 2002 could also be an indicator of having reached a stage 
where, due to improvement in the use of technology, firms are able to compete internationally. 
Interestingly, South African cement manufacturers recently alleged that the Pakistani cement 
producers have initiated a dumping policy to capture more of the market share and probably that 
has only been possible due to modernization of technology, significant capacity additions and more 
importantly a better use of technology in the post-privatization period. At home, there is a wider 
consensus that competition levels have been deteriorating since 1992 generally and from 1999 
onwards in particular. The benefits of falling marginal and average costs have not been passed on 
to the consumers. There is a belief that government has been the ultimate beneficiary by collecting 
more taxes due to an increase in the volume of sales. This issue will be investigated more 
assiduously in our future research. 
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Appendix A: Derivation of total factor productivity estimates using translog parametric 
production function estimation method  
The sensitivity of our DEA Malmquist productivity estimates is tested by estimating a parametric 
production function. The methodology to estimates popular translog production function is simple and is 
briefly explained here. Let assume 𝑥 represents a vector of variable inputs j (j = 1, . . ., J), y is a scalar 
output and 𝑡 is the time trend variable representative of the role of technology, the production function is 
written as: 
y = f(x, t)   
(1) 
By log (𝑙𝑛) transforming 𝑥 and y, individual firms represented by subscript i, time represented by 𝑡 and 
statistical noise term 𝑣𝑖𝑡, translog production function is specified as followed: 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 = α0 + ∑ α𝑗
𝑗
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 + α𝑡𝑡 +
1
2
{∑ ∑ α𝑗𝑘
𝑘𝑗
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡+α𝑡𝑡𝑡
2} + ∑ α𝑗𝑡
𝑗
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡    
(2) 
After estimating the above model, the technical change index is obtained by taking the derivatives of time 
trend 𝑡 and expressed as: 
 Technical change (TC) = αt + αtt + ∑ αjt𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑗j       
(3)     
 Change in total factor productivity is calculated from the above (2) as follows: 
Total factor productivity = 𝑇𝐶 + (𝑅𝑇𝑆 − 1) ∑ ℇ𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑗
𝐽
   
(4) 
where RTS is returns to scale and ℇ𝑗 are input elasticities which are substituted for the input shares: 
ℇ𝑗 =
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑦
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑗
= 𝛼𝑗 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑘 + 𝛼𝑗𝑡𝑡
𝑘
    
(5) 
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One of the advantages of using this approach is that it uses all data at the estimation stage and hence 
addresses the issue of too few observations in estimating productivity estimates under DEA framework. 
Following estimates of productivity and technical change does confirm that despite differences in the 
magnitudes, qualitative conclusions remain same as discussed in the section 8.2. 
 
      Total productivity change  Technical change  
Industry Privatized Public Private  Industry Privatized Public Private 
Overall 1.030 
  
1.030  1.031 
 
1.020 1.029 
1987-91 1.007 
 
1.008 1.006  1.007 
 
1.008 1.005 
1992-11 1.036 1.036 
 
1.036  1.037 1.037 
 
1.035 
1992-11a 1.035 1.037 
 
1.035  1.036 1.037 
 
1.035      
 
    
Notes: a. Excluding 2007 
 
Appendix B: Determinants of technical and efficiency change 
 
Profitability Capital  
expenditure 
Capacity 
utilization 
Financial 
expenses 
Firm  
size 
Demand Population 
Technical change 
?̂? 0.0518 -0.0287**  0.0022** -0.0906*** 0.0967*** 0.0024*** 
se 0.1045 0.0118  0.0011 0.0155 0.0095 0.0005 
Efficiency change 
?̂? 
 
-0.0230 -0.1358** 0.0029*** -0.1173*** 0.1395*** 0.0002 
se 
 
0.0126 0.0533 0.0012 0.0204 0.0148 0.0005 
*** significant at 1%. 
**   significant at 5%. 
*     significant at 10%. 
 
 
 
 
